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Abstract
In The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform,
I explained how issues surrounding consumer and other adhesive
arbitration agreements became divisive along predictable political lines
(progressives vs. conservatives) and proposed an intermediate (or
centrist) position to resolve those issues. However, The Politics of
Arbitration Law did not argue the case for my proposals. It left those
arguments for this Article, which makes the case against current
(conservative) arbitration law, and a third article, which will make the
case against progressive proposals to reform arbitration law. In other
words, this Article stands out from the many other articles critiquing
current arbitration law because this Article’s critique comes from a
centrist, rather than progressive, perspective. For that reason, this
Article’s critique may be more likely than progressive critiques to gain
traction with lawmakers.
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INTRODUCTION
The basic principle advanced in this Article is congruity. Arbitration
law should be congruous with non-arbitration law. Specifically, adhesive
arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other adhesion
contracts, neither more nor less so. While conforming arbitration law to
other law is generally good policy, this congruity principle should not be
taken to the extreme. In a few respects, adhesive arbitration agreements
should be more enforceable than other adhesion contracts. These
exceptions are necessary to preserve “arbitration” as that term is used in
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governing law—primarily, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1—and in
ordinary speech.
In the United States, litigation is the default process of dispute
resolution; that is, parties can contract into alternative processes of
dispute resolution (such as arbitration), but if they do not, then each party
retains the right to have the dispute resolved in litigation. Thus, to
contract out of the litigation default and into arbitration is to trade away
the right to litigate.
In The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for
Reform,2 I placed on a continuum five positions on the level of consent
courts should require to enforce arbitration agreements.3 The continuum
labels these positions as the Very Progressive Position, the Moderately
Progressive Position, the Centrist Position, the Moderately Conservative
Position, and the Very Conservative Position.4 Each position differs
regarding the level of consent required for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. The continuum, as a whole, reflects the political divide that
has developed between progressives and conservatives regarding
arbitration law.
Generally, conservatives support and progressives oppose the law’s
current position strongly enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements.5 Until
1984, adhesive arbitration agreements were generally unenforceable.6
However, from 1984 to 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided many cases
that changed the law to result in routine enforcement of adhesive
arbitration agreements.7 The Court’s pro-enforcement majorities nearly
always included Justices appointed by Democratic presidents.8 These
majorities, although creating dramatic changes in arbitration law, were not
extreme in the political context of that era.9 Since then, however, the
political center on consumer law has moved somewhat to the left while the
Supreme Court’s decisions on adhesive arbitration law have moved further
1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)).
2. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform,
53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711 (2016).
3. Id. at 725–26.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 713–14.
6. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.13–.14 (3d
ed. 2016).
7. Id. §§ 2.27–.28.
8. The one significant exception to this, and perhaps a precursor to the Court’s recent
partisan or ideological arbitration voting, was a consumer arbitration case, Green Tree Fin. Corp.Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), in which the pro-enforcement majority consisted of
five Republican-appointees while the four dissenters consisted of the two Democratic-appointees
then on the Court plus Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, who was appointed by the first President
Bush. Ware, supra note 2, at 721 & nn.49–54.
9. Ware, supra note 2, at 722.
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right, resulting in governing decisions that overly diverge from the political
mainstream.10 That divergence would be reduced, or even eliminated, if
this Article’s centrist approach11 was adopted.
As noted above, in The Politics of Arbitration Law I placed on a
continuum five positions regarding the level of consent courts should
require to enforce arbitration agreements.12 The Very Progressive
Position would require post-dispute consent for all individuals’
arbitration agreements and the Moderately Progressive Position would
enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements only when those agreements
are not adhesive.13 So neither Progressive Position would enforce any
adhesive arbitration agreements formed by individuals, such as
consumers and employees. In contrast, the Centrist Position I advocate
defends arbitration law’s use of contract law’s low standards of consent,
which result in enforcement of most adhesive contract terms, including
most adhesive arbitration agreements.14 Further to the right, both
Conservative Positions not only use contract law’s low standards of
consent, but also apply the separability doctrine, which prevents courts
from hearing defenses to contract enforcement.15 The difference between
the two Conservative Positions is that while the Moderately Conservative
Position, like positions to its left, subjects arbitration agreements to the
same limits as general contract law, the Very Conservative Position
exempts arbitration agreements from limits relating to appealing legally
erroneous decisions and to class waivers.16
The Politics of Arbitration Law took the Centrist Position, arguing that
adhesive arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other
adhesive contracts.17 The Centrist Position rejects current law’s
conservative-supported anomalies in which courts enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesive contracts.18 This
Article makes the arguments against those anomalies.
Part I critiques current, conservative-supported arbitration law for
failing, in three important and controversial respects, to conform to the
principle that adhesive arbitration agreements should be no more
enforceable than other adhesion contracts. Current law enforces adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts in
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 723.
See infra Appendix.
See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
Ware, supra note 2, at 734.
Id. at 738–39.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
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three controversial respects: the separability doctrine, correction of
legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers.
First, current law applies the separability doctrine, which prevents
courts from hearing defenses to contract enforcement, such as
misrepresentation and duress, when the contract at issue has an arbitration
clause.19 This Article opposes the separability doctrine and contends that
courts should be available to hear defenses to the enforcement of
arbitration clauses and to the contracts containing such clauses. The right
to litigate is particularly important in the United States.20 Under the
separability doctrine, however, courts hold that a party trades away her
right to litigate by assenting to a contract that was induced by
misrepresentation, duress, or other grounds constituting a legallyrecognized defense to contract enforcement.21 Thus, this Article’s
Centrist Position rejects the separability doctrine, arguing instead that
contract defenses should protect the right to litigate as fully as they
protect other rights that can be traded away by adhesion contracts.
Second, current law enforces arbitration agreements that trade away
the right to appeal,22 resulting in little judicial review of arbitrators’
decisions, even arbitrators’ erroneous rulings on questions of law. Courts
occasionally vacate an arbitrator’s award on the ground that the arbitrator
exhibited a “manifest disregard of law,”23 but “manifest disregard”
requires much more than an error of law—it requires proof the arbitrator
19. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
20. The judiciary and litigation have long played a larger role in the United States than in
other democracies. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 13 (2001) (“[V]iewed in comparative perspective, the United States is distinctive . . . . It is
especially inclined to authorize and encourage the use of adversarial litigation to . . . resolve
disputes.”); id. at 16 (“Adversarial legalism gives the United States the most politically and
socially responsive court system in the world. . . . [T]he judiciary and lawyers [are] more fully
part of the governing process and more fully democratic in character.”); David Nelken, Beyond
Compare? Criticizing “The American Way of Law,” 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 799, 819 (2003)
(“What we can be certain of is that in these other places lawyers are less central and litigation is
allowed a much smaller role than in the United States.”).
21. See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71.
22. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 500 (2009) (“Arbitration typically does not have an appeals
process, unless the parties agree by contract to create one. Courts review arbitration awards only
on narrow, usually procedural, grounds, and the United States Supreme Court has curtailed the
ability of parties to expand that review by contract.” (footnotes omitted)); Maureen A. Weston,
The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency
Regulation, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 62–63 (2013) (“Arbitration awards are virtually
unreviewable on the merits and are rarely vacated.”).
23. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)).
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knew the law and chose to ignore it—so vacatur on this ground is
extremely rare. Courts apply this overly deferential standard of review
even in instances where the arbitration agreement calls for de novo
review.24 In contrast, this Article proposes that an arbitrator’s legally
erroneous decisions arising out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
should be subject to de novo review when the question is of mandatory,
as opposed to default, law.
Third, following the Supreme Court’s 2011 AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion decision,25 courts generally enforce adhesive arbitral class
waivers.26 This holding has since extended to contract law, generally.27
Arbitration law, however, is not centrally concerned with class actions,
which came into being after the FAA.28 Thus, this Article proposes that
arbitration law defer to other law in deciding whether class waivers are
enforceable.
In sum, Part I of this Article discusses the three important and
controversial ways current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements
more broadly than other adhesion contracts and argues that these
exceptions should end. In contrast, Part II notes the relatively
uncontroversial ways in which courts should continue to enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts. Under
current law, adhesive arbitration agreements typically reduce discovery29
and evidentiary rules.30 The FAA also mandates enforcement of adhesive
agreements providing for an arbitrator rather than a jury.31 Enforcing
adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion
contracts on these three topics—discovery, evidence, and jury—is
24. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
25. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
26. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013);
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351–52.
27. Compare Grant v. Convergys Corp., No. 4:12-CV-496 (CEJ), 2013 WL 781898, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2013) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton
Homes, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 682, 692 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver),
Birdsong v. AT&T Corp., No. C12-6175 TEH, 2013 WL 1120783, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), Killion v. KeHE Distribs., 885 F. Supp. 2d 874,
882, 884–85 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver and citing Concepcion as
support for the proposition that “collective actions may be waived”), and Palmer v. Convergys
Corp., No. 7:10-cv-145 (HL), 2012 WL 425256, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (enforcing a nonarbitral class waiver).
28. Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922–1947,
31 F.R.D. 307, 512 (1963) (“[O]n September 16, 1938, three months after the adjournment of its
session, the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] went into operation.”).
29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (finding lesser
discovery in arbitration an insufficient reason to deny enforcement to adhesive employment
arbitration agreement).
30. See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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necessary to distinguish arbitration from litigation, and is not troubling
under the Centrist Position, which would subject arbitration agreements’
provisions on these three topics to judicial policing through contract
defenses such as unconscionability.
I. THE CASE FOR THE CENTRIST POSITION OVER THE CONSERVATIVE
POSITIONS
This Part discusses the three important and controversial ways
current law fails to conform to the principle that adhesive arbitration
agreements should only be as enforceable as other adhesive contracts.
This Part argues against these anomalies and thus for reforming
arbitration law so it is more congruous with other law.
A. Overview
Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly
than other adhesion contracts in three important and controversial
respects:
(1)

while contract defenses (such as misrepresentation and
duress) protect other rights that adhesion contracts can
trade away, the separability doctrine removes contract
defenses’ protection from the main right traded away
by an arbitration agreement—the right to litigate;

(2)

while courts do not enforce non-arbitration adhesion
contracts prohibiting appeal, which trade away the right
to correct legally erroneous decisions on mandatorylaw claims, courts routinely enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements that effectively trade away that
right; and

(3)

while courts, at least before Concepcion, rarely
enforced non-arbitration adhesion contracts purporting
to trade away the right to participate in a class action,
courts frequently enforce such “class waivers” in
adhesive arbitration agreements.

In each of these respects, current law is more conservative than this
Article’s Centrist Position of making adhesive arbitration agreements
only as enforceable as other adhesion contracts. Therefore, the centrist
proposals in this Article include:
(1)

rejecting the separability doctrine, so contract defenses
protect the right to litigate as fully as they protect other
rights that adhesion contracts can trade away;
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(2)

vacating arbitrators’ legally erroneous decisions on
mandatory-law claims when the award arises out of
adhesive or other pre-dispute arbitration agreements;
and

(3)

treating arbitral class waivers like other class waivers,
so the right to participate in a class action is no more
easily traded away in an adhesive arbitration agreement
than in an adhesive non-arbitration agreement.

[Vol. 68

The following subsections of this Article address in turn the separability
doctrine, legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers.
B. Use Contract Defenses to Protect the Right to Litigate Like Other
Rights: Reject the Separability Doctrine
The first important and controversial way current law makes
adhesive arbitration agreements more enforceceable than other adhesion
contracts is the separability doctrine, which prevents contract defenses
from protecting the right to litigate.
1. The Separability Doctrine
When a party opposes enforcement of an arbitration clause on the
ground that the contract containing that clause is voidable due to a
contract-law
defense—such
as
misrepresentation,
duress,
unconscionability, or illegality—the “separability doctrine” instructs
courts to send the case to arbitration without first determining whether the
facts prove the alleged defense.32 The separability doctrine, as reflected in
the three Supreme Court decisions addressing it,33 treats the arbitration
clause as a separately enforceable agreement from the contract containing
it: If the alleged defense is not focused on the arbitration clause in
particular, then the court enforces that clause to require arbitration of
whether the contract containing it is enforceable, as well as arbitration of
the merits of the claims asserted by one party against the other.34
For instance, suppose Consumer sues Lender alleging that a year after
Lender contracted with and lent to Consumer, Lender violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)35 by providing false information to a credit

32. Ware, supra note 2, at 741–43.
33. See supra text accompanying note 19.
34. Ware, supra note 2, at 743.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x (2012)).
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bureau.36 Suppose Lender then moves to stay the case and compel
arbitration of Consumer’s claims based on the arbitration clause in the
adhesion contract between Consumer and Lender. If Consumer opposes
Lender’s motion to compel on the ground that Lender’s fraudulent
misrepresentations induced Consumer to assent to the contract, the court
will refuse to hear Consumer’s misrepresentation defense.37 Instead, the
court will grant Lender’s motion to compel arbitration of Consumer’s
FCRA claim, effectively telling Consumer to make her misrepresentation
argument to the arbitrator.38 If the arbitrator rejects Consumer’s
misrepresentation argument, then Consumer must arbitrate the merits of
her FCRA claim or abandon it. Further, Consumer can only get judicial
review of the arbitrator’s decision on misrepresentation after the
arbitrator’s decision on the merits of her FCRA claim—by filing a motion
to vacate the arbitration award.39 Even if Consumer persuades the arbitrator
that Lender’s fraudulent misrepresentations induced her to assent to the
contract, Consumer probably must nevertheless arbitrate the merits of her
FCRA claim or abandon it.40

36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1); see, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d
426, 428 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding a credit card company liable under FCRA for insufficiently
investigating before reporting adverse information about a debtor to credit reporting agencies).
37. These hypothetical facts are the consumer-context equivalent of the facts in the
landmark Supreme Court decision adopting the separability doctrine. See Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04. If Prima Paint had argued that there was fraud
“directed to the arbitration clause itself,” then the making of the arbitration agreement would have
been an issue, and Prima Paint would have been entitled to a trial on that issue, but the FAA “does
not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract
generally.” Id.
38. See id. at 406–07; WARE, supra note 6, §§ 2.19–.21.
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
40. The separability doctrine holds that the arbitrator’s invalidation of the contract
containing an arbitration clause does not invalidate the arbitration clause. See, e.g., William W.
Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 143 (1997) (“[T]he separability doctrine permits arbitrators to
invalidate the main contract (e.g., for illegality or fraud in the inducement) without the risk that
their decision will call into question the validity of the arbitration clause from which they derive
their power.”); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68 (2d ed.
2001) (“Another possible consequence of the separability doctrine is that, if an arbitral tribunal or
court concludes that the parties’ entire underlying contract was void, that conclusion would not
necessarily deprive the parties’ arbitration agreement—and hence, in a Catch-22 turn, the
arbitrators’ award—of validity.”); Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in
International Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?,
13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 20–21 (2002) (“[S]eparability means that . . . a party’s challenge to
the validity of the underlying contract does not automatically deprive the arbitral tribunal of
jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the challenged contract.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 1

1236

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

What the previous paragraph said about misrepresentation is also true
of other contract defenses, such as mistake,41 duress,42 undue influence,43
unconscionability,44 frustration of purpose,45 illegality,46 and probably
incapacity.47 Suppose that instead of arguing Lender’s misrepresentation
induced her to enter into the contract containing the arbitration clause,
Consumer argued that duress induced her—Lender pointed a gun at
Consumer’s head and said “sign the contract or I’ll shoot you.” Although
no allegations that extreme have yet found their way into a reported case
41. See Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2004);
Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 528–29 (1st
Cir. 1985). But see Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1066 (10th Cir. 2004) (hearing the argument
that the arbitration agreement was voidable due to mistake rather than sending the case to an
arbitrator, without discussing the severability doctrine or Prima Paint).
42. See SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 707 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
Condominium Association’s coercion claim is arbitrable because it is a challenge to the validity
(rather than the formation) of [the contract containing the arbitration clause].”); In re FirstMerit
Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001) (“[T]he defenses of unconscionability, duress,
fraudulent inducement, and revocation . . . must specifically relate to the Arbitration Addendum
itself, not the contract as a whole, if they are to defeat arbitration. Defenses that pertain to the
entire installment contract can be arbitrated.” (footnote omitted)); Service Corp. Intern. v. Lopez,
162 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 2005) (“Th[e] issue [of duress] relates to the contract as a whole
and not solely the arbitration provision. It is therefore an issue to be decided in arbitration.”). But
see Flannery v. Tri-State Div., 402 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[P]laintiff’s claim
of duress challenges the existence of the contract itself, and therefore relates to all the clauses and
provisions in it, including the arbitration clause. The argument that the arbitration clause is invalid
and unenforceable, therefore, is not barred by the rule in Prima Paint.”).
43. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir.
1981) (duress and undue influence); Lake Erie Towing v. Walter, No. 1:07-cv-02312, 2007 WL
2907496, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2007) (“The Defendants’ Undue Influence Claim Challenges
the Contract Generally and Therefore Belongs in Front of the Arbitrator, not the Court.”).
44. Substantive unconscionability of contract terms other than the arbitration clause is an
issue for the arbitrator. See Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 F.3d
721, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2003). For cases holding that arbitrators, not courts, assess
unconscionability of container contract, see WARE, supra note 6, § 2.25.
45. See Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d at 528–29 (“[T]he arbitration clause is
separable from the contract and is not rescinded by [defendant’s] attempt to rescind the entire
contract based on . . . frustration of purpose.”); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541
F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1976).
46. See Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 502–03 (2012) (noting that the
arbitrator, rather than the court, determines questions as to whether an employee’s noncompetition agreement is void as against public policy); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442, 448–49 (2006).
47. Federal courts have split on the question of mental incapacity. Compare Spahr v. Secco,
330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (a court deciding defense of mental incapacity), with
Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (an arbitrator deciding defense
of mental incapacity). A related question is a minor’s lack of capacity to contract. See H & S
Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630–31 (Ala. 2001) (allowing limited discovery on
minority issue at time of motion to compel arbitration in the trial court); Douglass v. Pflueger
Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 138–39 (Haw. 2006).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss5/1

10

Ware: The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law

2016]

CURRENT (CONSERVATIVE) ARBITRATION LAW

1237

on the separability doctrine, other duress allegations have, and courts have
applied the separability doctrine to grant the motion to compel arbitration,
effectively telling the party in Consumer’s role to make her duress
argument to the arbitrator.48 These decisions are straightforward
applications of the Supreme Court decisions adopting and articulating the
separability doctrine. That doctrine calls for duress arguments, including
those alleging contracts signed at gunpoint, to be arbitrated rather than
litigated.49
The same goes for arguments that the contract containing the
arbitration clause is unconscionable. Unconscionability may be the most
frequently asserted contract defense in the adhesion-contract context.
Due to the separability doctrine, arbitrators, rather than courts, initially
hear unconscionability arguments when a party to the arbitration
agreement, such as Lender, requests that.50
Suppose however, instead of arguing that the contract containing the
arbitration clause is unconscionable, Consumer argues that the arbitration
clause itself is unconscionable. Before 2010, a court likely would have
heard and resolved that argument (rather than sending it to the arbitrator),
and a large body of case law developed about which arbitration clauses
were unconscionable.51 However, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,52 enforced a clause that said:
[T]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or
agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or
formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any
claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or
voidable.53
In Rent-A-Center, Jackson argued that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable, so he should have been free to litigate, rather than
arbitrate, his claims against Rent-A-Center.54 The Supreme Court
48. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 121 (2007).
49. See id. at 121–22.
50. For cases holding that arbitrators, not courts, assess unconscionability of container
contracts, see WARE, supra note 6, § 2.25.
51. See id.; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008); Susan Landrum,
Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the
Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 776 (2014); Susan
Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–96 (2004).
52. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
53. Id. at 66.
54. Id.
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rejected Jackson’s argument on the ground that the just-quoted
“delegation clause” constituted his agreement to arbitrate whether other
portions of his arbitration clause were unconscionable.55 By contrast, had
Jackson argued that the delegation clause itself was unconscionable, the
Supreme Court suggested a court, rather than an arbitrator, would hear
that argument.56 In other words, Rent-A-Center seems to treat the
delegation clause as separable from the broader arbitration clause in much
the same way as the separability doctrine treats an arbitration clause as
separable from the still-broader container contract.57 So in some cases
current law provides that courts will not initially hear a defense to
contract enforcement even when that defense focuses specifically on the
arbitration clause itself rather than on the whole contract containing the
arbitration clause. And stepping back from Rent-A-Center and delegation
clauses to the longstanding, basic separability doctrine, courts generally
will not initially hear a contract defense applying to the whole contract.58
55. Id. at 73.
56. See id. at 72 (“[U]nless Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we
must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the
validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.”). Few reported cases since Rent-A-Center
address arguments that the delegation clause is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Most
of these enforce the delegation clause. See Halliday v. Beneficial Fin. I, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-708,
2013 WL 693022, at *3, *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013) (“Because the Court concludes that the
delegation provision is not unconscionable, the threshold issue of whether the remainder of the
arbitration clause is unconscionable is a matter for arbitration.”); Dean v. Draughons Junior Coll.,
Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (enforcing the delegation clause and sending
to arbitration the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable); Chung v. Nemer,
No. C12-4608 PJH, 2012 WL 5289414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (enforcing the delegation
clause and granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration); Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc.,
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that “it will be for the arbitrator to consider
the conscionability of the agreement as a whole” and rejecting the argument that delegation clause
was unconscionable).
57. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1103, 1121 (2011) (“Rent-A-Center extended the separability principle by treating the
arbitration agreement itself as entailing two separate contracts.”); David Horton, The Federal
Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1058 n.181 (2012) (“[T]he
Court conceptualized the delegation clause as an independent arbitration clause (‘an agreement to
arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement’) within a broader contract to
arbitrate (the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims).”).
For cases applying Rent-A-Center, see, for example, Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 988
(9th Cir. 2011) (finding that language in an arbitration agreement providing that parties agree to
arbitrate any dispute that “‘arises out of or relates to . . . the validity or application of any of the
provisions of this Section 4’ . . . constitutes ‘an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning
the arbitration agreement”’ under Rent-A-Center); Hawkins v. Region’s, 944 F. Supp. 2d 528,
530–31 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (“The court recognizes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson
might be regarded by some as creating a legal ‘black hole’ which inevitably sucks in disputes and
sends them to arbitration (at least in cases involving a delegation clause).”).
58. See Ware, supra note 2, at 742.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss5/1

12

Ware: The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law

2016]

CURRENT (CONSERVATIVE) ARBITRATION LAW

1239

The separability doctrine, including Rent-A-Center’s extension of it to
delegation clauses, is generally supported by conservatives—from the
Republican-appointed Supreme Court Justices, who cast all five majority
votes in Rent-A-Center;59 to the Chamber of Commerce, which filed an
amicus brief for Rent-A-Center;60 to Republican members of Congress,
who oppose the separability-repealing Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).61
In contrast, progressives—including the co-sponsors of the AFA62 and
the dissenters in Rent-A-Center63—provide the bulk of the opposition to
the separability doctrine. I have long opposed the separability doctrine64
and continue to believe that courts should be able to initially hear
defenses to the enforcement of arbitration clauses and to the contracts
containing arbitration clauses. A proposed law reform to this effect,
written as a rule the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau could enact,
is in the Appendix.
2. The Case Against the Separability Doctrine
Before holding that a party has traded away her right to litigate, should
the law require an enforceable contract or merely a contract that might or
might not be enforceable? That is the question addressed by the
separability doctrine, which requires only a contract, not necessarily an
enforceable contract, to trade away the right to litigate and substitute
arbitration for litigation.65 If a contract defense, such as
misrepresentation,66 applies to an entire contract—to all of its clauses,
including the arbitration clause—then that contract is not enforceable but
is nevertheless sufficient under the separability doctrine to trade away the
right to litigate.

59. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 64.
60. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 783668.
61. H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); David Lazarus, Bill Aims to Restore Consumers’
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/business/la-filazarus-20111018.
62. H.R. 1844 (“The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the
validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a
court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges
the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing
such agreement.”).
63. Ware, supra note 2, at 720 (showing that dissenting Justices in Rent-A-Center were all
appointed by Democratic presidents).
64. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
83, 128–38, 159–60 (1996).
65. Ware, supra note 2, at 743.
66. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.1.
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In contrast, this Article argues that if a party who seeks to litigate a
claim asserts a defense to the enforcement of her contract containing an
arbitration clause, then a court should bar litigation of the claim only if
the court concludes the elements of the defense are not present. In other
words, only an enforceable contract should be enough to opt out of the
litigation default and into arbitration. The courthouse door should be open
to parties asserting defenses to enforcement of their contracts containing
arbitration clauses and should be closed to them only if they formed an
enforceable contract in which they agreed to arbitrate.
This conclusion rests on the importance in protecting parties’ rights of
both the litigation default and contract defenses. In the United States,
access to the courts—the right to litigate—is basic to our system of
government.67 Making this right alienable through pre-dispute arbitration
agreements is controversial, and rejected by those who hold the Very
Progressive Position, including the many advocates of the Arbitration
Fairness Act.68 Even more controversial is making the right to litigate
alienable through adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements, an
approach rejected by both the Moderately and Very Progressive
Positions.69
In contrast to the two Progressive Positions, which either never
enforce individuals’ pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate or enforce only
those to which the individual “non-adhesively” consented, the Centrist
Position this Article advocates defends arbitration law’s use of contract
law’s low standards of consent, which enforce most adhesive contract
terms, including most adhesive arbitration clauses.70 However contract
law’s standards of consent can properly be low only because they are
supplemented by contract law’s defenses. These defenses are contract
law’s main tools to soften the sometimes-harsh effects of those low
consent standards.71 Thus, arbitration law can properly subject the right
to litigate to contract law’s low standards of consent only if arbitration
law also protects that right with contract law’s defenses. In other words,
courts can properly enforce adhesive arbitration agreements only if the
separability doctrine is repealed.72

67. Ware, supra note 2, at 727.
68. Id. at 732–34.
69. Id. at 734–38.
70. Id. at 738–41.
71. See Ware, supra note 48, at 111.
72. For twenty years, I have advocated enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements, see
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 213 (1998) [hereinafter Ware,
Consumer], and repealing the separability doctrine. See Ware, supra note 64, at 86.
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As just argued, contract defenses are important and thoroughly
interwoven with contract law’s low “objective manifestation-of-assent”
standards of consent, so separating the two, as the separability doctrine
does, is unwise. They are two sides of the same coin. Contract scholars
of the Right as well as of the Left recognize that the defenses are
thoroughly interwoven with “manifestation-of-assent.” As libertarian
contracts scholar Randy Barnett puts it, contract defenses “describ[e]
circumstances that, if proved to have existed, deprive the manifestation
of assent of its normal moral, and therefore legal, significance.”73 In
short, the separability doctrine deprives the right to litigate of the
protection offered by contract law’s defenses and thus enforces
agreements (manifestations of assent) to alienate that right under
circumstances that deprive the agreements of their normal moral
significance and thus should also deprive the agreements of their legal
significance. This, at bottom, is why the separability doctrine should be
repealed.
3. The Separability Doctrine is Not Merely a Default Rule or
Presumption
The strongest argument for the separability doctrine is that it is merely
a default rule.74 A default rule is a legal rule that governs in the absence
of an enforceable contract term to the contrary.75 For example, in a sale
73. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318 (1986);
see also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 (6th ed. 2009) (stating
that under circumstances of duress, “consent is real enough; the vice of it is that it was coerced in
a manner that society brands as wrongful”); id. § 9.10(a) (describing broad categories of undue
influence, one of which involves using “psychological position in an unfair manner to induce the
subservient party to consent to an agreement to which the other party would not otherwise have
consented”); Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 57, 75 (2012) (noting that contract defenses such as mistake and incompetence
“rest on the notion that the parties would not have consented had they known about the mistake
or had the capacity to consent”); Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts,
52 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 405 (2014) (describing “defenses said to go to the quality of the mutual
assent . . . includ[ing] duress, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, mutual
mistake, and unilateral mistake, the presence of which will make a contract unenforceable due to
lack of ‘consent’”).
74. See Richard E. Speidel, International Commercial Arbitration: Implementing the New
York Convention, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J.
WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 185, 260 n.284 (2006)
(characterizing the separability doctrine as a “default rule”); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57,
at 1121 (“Separability permitted the development of a default rule for allocation of authority.
Under that default rule, courts resolve challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
and arbitrators resolve challenges to the enforceability of the underlying substantive contract.”).
75. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”); Yair Listokin, The Meaning of
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of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the default rule is
that the seller’s place of business is the place for delivery of the goods,
but the parties can opt out of that default with a contract term requiring
delivery at some other location.76
Default rules generally should, many argue, conform to what most
contracting parties want, so fewer parties have to incur the costs of
negotiating and drafting a contract term to replace the default rule.77
Along these lines, defenders of the separability doctrine argue that most
parties to contracts containing arbitration clauses would want arbitrators,
rather than courts, to initially hear defenses to enforcement of those
contracts. Thus, these separability-defenders argue, this should be the
default rule, and if particular parties instead want courts to initially hear
such defenses, then those parties can write that into their agreement and
opt out of the default rule. For example, Professor Christopher Drahozal
writes, “[S]o long as the parties have manifested assent to the main
contract [containing an arbitration clause] (even if there may be a defense
to enforcement), it is at least plausible to presume (i.e., to treat as a
default) that they would want an arbitrator rather than a court to
adjudicate that defense.”78
This presumption, however, seems often unrealistic, especially in the
context of consumer adhesion contracts, as in the FCRA example above.
When sophisticated parties negotiate and draft a custom contract, they
Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 397, 399 (2010) (“Contracts are
inevitably incomplete. One of contract law’s primary roles consists of filling in the gaps of
contracts with default rules.”); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules
and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2014) (“Contract law . . . provides
the parties with numerous default rules that become part of their contracts unless the parties
implicitly or explicitly reject them.”).
76. U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
77. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (“We treat corporate law as a standard-form contract, supplying terms
most venturers would have chosen . . . . [C]orporate law should contain the terms people would
have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently
low.”); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (1985) (“The ambition of the law governing the debtorcreditor relationship, including fraudulent conveyance law, should provide all the parties with the
type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain
over all aspects of their deal.”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (“Ideally,
the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties
would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction.”).
78. Christopher R. Drahozal, Buckeye Check Cashing and the Separability Doctrine, 1
Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 55, 87 n.155 (2011) (citing Alan Scott Rau, “Separability” in the
United States Supreme Court, 1 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter Rau,
Separability]; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of “Consent,” 24 ARB.
INT’L 199, 221 (2008) [hereinafter Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction]).
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may think about whether courts or arbitrators will, in a potential dispute
that has not arisen yet, decide the parties’ arguments that their contract
was usurious, unconscionable, or induced by fraud or a gun to the head;
those sophisticated parties might even want the arbitrator to decide those
arguments. But it is doubtful the typical consumer borrower even notices
the arbitration clause in her adhesion contract, let alone thinks through
the division of authority between arbitrator and court in a potential
dispute enough to have wants about what the arbitrator, as opposed to the
court, should decide.79 And if the typical consumer borrower did, at the
time of contract formation, have a preference about who should decide
whether the contract is usurious, unconscionable, or induced by fraud or
a gun to the head, the borrower might well prefer the court, rather than
arbitrator.
More fundamentally, the problem with the separability-is-just-agood-default-presumption argument is that it treats the parties’ signatures
on (or other manifestations of assent to) a contract containing an
arbitration clause as if they are the only legally relevant fact. The
separability-is-just-a-good-default-presumption argument thus overlooks
the other legally relevant fact: litigation is the default process of dispute
resolution so, before signing, each party had a right to litigate any
disputes that might arise between them and neither party had a right to
arbitrate such disputes.80 Therefore, courts cannot properly treat their
signatures as breaking a tie between otherwise equally strong claims by
litigation and arbitration to resolve their disputes.
Instead, the pre-signing claim of litigation to resolve their disputes is
far stronger than the pre-signing claim of arbitration to resolve their
disputes, so the question is whether the signatures are weighty enough to
more than offset that very strong pre-signing presumption of litigation
over arbitration. A signature induced by misrepresentation, duress, or
other circumstances constituting a contract defense is simply not that
weighty. That is, a signature under circumstances that “deprive [that]
manifestation of assent of its normal moral . . . significance”81 is not
weighty enough to more than offset the pre-signing litigation default and
thus alienate the right to litigate. A signature or other manifestation of
assent needs to be made in circumstances free of a contract defense to
acquire moral significance sufficient to offset the pre-agreement
litigation default and thus alienate the right to litigate. For example,
almost no moral significance attaches to a signature obtained at gunpoint.
Yet the separability-is-just-a-good-default-presumption argument
presumes that a signature obtained at gunpoint retains much of a typical
79. See, e.g., Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 431–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting
that credit card arbitration clauses were not “visible or meaningful to consumers”).
80. See supra notes 1–2, 20 and accompanying text.
81. See Barnett, supra note 73, at 318.
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signature’s moral significance. At the least, the separability-is-just-agood-default-presumption argument requires a coherent and practical
way for separability cases to distinguish signatures at gunpoint from more
common contract-defense allegations that, if proven, drain less moral
significance from the signature. No one has convincingly provided that
argument.82
4. The Separability Doctrine’s Application to Forum-Selection Clauses
Distinguished
Another argument for the separability doctrine begins with the
assertion that it applies not only to arbitration clauses (agreements
choosing arbitration over litigation) but also to forum-selection clauses
(agreements choosing litigation in one jurisdiction over litigation in
another jurisdiction). Here, assume all relevant jurisdictions and parties
are within the United States, as a later subsection of this Article addresses
the separability doctrine in the international arbitration context. To
reiterate, the argument under consideration is that because the
separability doctrine applies to contracts containing forum-selection
clauses then it should also apply to contracts containing arbitration
clauses. Supporting this argument is the fact that most courts have applied
the separability doctrine to forum-selection clauses, thus holding that
only the court named in the clause should resolve an argument that the
contract containing that clause was fraudulently induced.83 However,
some of these cases are international,84 and the rest seem to involve
82. The best argument along those lines is Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits
of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 499 n.221, 514 n.263 (2011)
(distinguishing “a signature at gunpoint [which] can only mean that the arbitration clause [along
with all the contract’s other clauses] was induced by coercion,” from a misrepresentation about a
non-arbitration aspect of the main contract—“say, about a consulting business (as in Prima Paint
itself) [which would not] be pertinent—transposable—to the arbitration agreement”). The
problem with this argument is that, as Professor Rau acknowledges, “hornbook Contract law for
the last century has treated misrepresentation as ‘a defense that (if proven) makes all the terms of
the contract unenforceable.’” Id. at 501 n.227. Professor Rau advocates an arbitration-only
exception to this venerable contract law on misrepresentation, but such an arbitration-only
exception seems unwise for two reasons: (1) it would be hard for courts to apply in practice
(complexities avoided by a century of “hornbook contract law” are probably too complex to be
worthwhile); and (2) it would deprive the right to litigate of some of the protection the
misrepresentation defense provides other rights that parties can trade away by contract.
83. Drahozal, supra note 78, at 84 & n.145.
84. Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
“[o]nly when we can discern the [forum-selection] clause itself was obtained in contravention of
the law will the federal courts disregard it and proceed to judge the merits” and basing the decision
to uphold forum selection clause, in part, on international “comity concerns” (emphasis added));
Haynsworth v. Lloyd’s of London, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Fraud and overreaching
must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it.”).
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agreements between businesses,85 as opposed to consumer or
employment adhesion contracts.
The Eighth Circuit refused to apply the separability doctrine to a
forum-selection clause. It held that “in a situation where a fiduciary
relationship (such as between a commodities broker and its customer) is
created by a contract tainted by fraud, the person defrauded can not be
held to the contractual forum selection clause.”86 The Eighth Circuit’s
rejection of a separability doctrine for forum-selection clauses is sound
for the same reasons given above for rejecting the separability doctrine
for arbitration clauses. Moreover, trading away the right to litigate, as an
arbitration agreement does, trades away a more fundamental right than
merely trading away the right to litigate in one U.S. jurisdiction’s courts
rather than in another’s. The fifty states’ courts are less different from
each other than they are from arbitration. Therefore, the separability
doctrine in forum-selection clauses is at best weak support for the
separability doctrine in arbitration agreements.
5. The Separability Doctrine in International Transactions
Distinguished
As explained above, the case against the separability doctrine is best
understood by starting with the recognition that litigation is the default
process of dispute resolution, so before contracting each party had a right
to litigate and no right to arbitrate.87 Only when starting with that precontracting baseline can one coherently ask whether an arbitration
agreement, such as Consumer’s adhesive agreement with Lender in the
FCRA example above, acquires enough moral significance from contract
law’s low “manifestation of assent” standards to trade away Consumer’s
right to litigate, or whether, as this Article contends, only agreements
untainted by a contract defense acquire that level of moral significance.88
85. Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Assocs. in Urology, 453 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Defendant here offers no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching on the part of
Plaintiff . . . in inducing Defendant to agree to inclusion of the forum selection clause in the
agreements.”); Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[It is]
settled law that unless there is a showing that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation induced the
party opposing a forum selection clause to agree to inclusion of that clause in the contract, a
general claim of fraud or misrepresentation as to the entire contract does not affect the validity of
the forum selection clause.”).
86. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier–Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir.
1986).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69; see also Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build
It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 580–81 (2007) (describing the right to litigate as “fundamental,
constitutional, and set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 36–40 (discussing an FCRA example) and notes
65–73 (discussing importance of contract defenses in ensuring agreements’ moral significance).
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To my knowledge, no defense of the separability doctrine
acknowledges:
(1) Litigation is the default process of dispute
resolution;
(2) so each party has a pre-agreement right to litigate;
and
(3) the separability doctrine deprives the right to litigate
of the protections afforded by contract law’s
defenses.
In other words, defenders of the separability doctrine do not begin
with the litigation default and pre-agreement right to litigate before
asking what process the law should require to trade away that right, as
this Article contends they should.
Perhaps separability defenders do not start with the litigation default
and pre-agreement right to litigate because many separability defenders
often write on international arbitration.89 In the more anarchic international
environment, litigation is not the default process of dispute resolution to
nearly the same degree as domestic litigation is the default process in the
United States. The international arena lacks a government able to impose
its courts’ jurisdiction and judgments on all relevant parties, and
cooperation among governments has not closed this gap. In other words,
the pre-agreement “right to litigate” has less value in the international
context because enforcement of courts’ judgments across international
borders tends to be less reliable than it is within the United States.90 In
89. See infra notes 92–93.
90. While the U.S. Constitution requires each state’s courts to give other states’ courts’
judgments “Full Faith and Credit,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, no comparable treaty among nations
exists. See Emilio Bettoni, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments Despite
the Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 157–58 (2013) (“Contrary to foreign arbitral
awards, which are widely recognized and enforced . . . [t]he only attempt to create a multilateral
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments on a global
scale . . . failed to attract the required executions and ratifications . . . .”); Steven C. Nelson,
Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L LAW. 187, 190 (1989) (noting the
difficulty in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments because these actions “depend on
notions of comity and fairness that are often vaguely and inconsistently articulated”); S.I. Strong,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities,
33 REV. LITIG. 45, 48, 51–52 (2014) (explaining that a proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments has thus far “proved impossible to enact,” and although work
continues, “there is no guarantee that the project would be successful”); Yuliya Zeynalova, The
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix
It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 152 (2013) (“[T]he absence of an international enforceability
regime for foreign judgments leaves a void in the realm of private international law that sits in
stark contrast to the well-established mechanism for enforcing foreign arbitral awards.”).
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short, international arbitration is less subordinate to international litigation
than domestic arbitration is to domestic litigation.
If the international arena lacks a strong pre-agreement right to litigate
in a court with power to compel the other party to comply with the court’s
judgments, then perhaps the only legally relevant fact in an international
case is the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, so the separability-is-just-agood-default-presumption argument has more force internationally than
it does in the domestic U.S. context.91 Furthermore, the types of parties
typically forming international arbitration agreements—governments and
large businesses—may generally protect themselves from the conduct
that would give rise to a contract defense better than the individuals who
often form domestic arbitration agreements. For example, individuals
seem more vulnerable to undue influence, unconscionability, duress, and
misrepresentation than governments and large businesses because
governments and large businesses seem harder than ordinary individuals
to bully and trick.92
For these reasons, the case for the separability doctrine is stronger in
the international context than in the domestic U.S. context. So it is
understandable that the most eloquent advocates of the separability
doctrine tend to be those who have written extensively on international
arbitration.93 Their arguments apply less to the domestic U.S. context,
91. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80.
92. See Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation:
Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21
(2003) (“There is less of a need for protection of clients in international commercial arbitration
because the parties are almost without exception international business entities. There are no
personal injury victims, no civil rights claimants, and no criminal defendants. As participants in
the global marketplace, the consumers of international commercial arbitration presumably have
significant financial resources and are sophisticated.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Jacob R.
Schaffer, Note, Rescuing the International Arbitral Model: Identifying the Problem in Natural
Resources Trade and Development, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 318–19 (2011) (stating that many
of the companies seeking arbitration in international business are large companies).
93. See Rau, Separability, supra note 78; Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction, supra note 78; see also
STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 18, 22 (1987);
John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and CompetenceCompetence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1116, 1119 (2003);
Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57, at 1121; William W. Park, Determining Arbitral
Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133,
143 (1997); Smit, supra note 40, at 22–23; Speidel, supra note 74, at 260 & n.284. By contrast,
scholars criticizing the separability doctrine tend to have written more on domestic than
international arbitration. See Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy,
Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 195–96 (1999);
Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 826–
28 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1391,
1456–58 (1991).
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especially the domestic U.S. context of adhesive arbitration agreements
(which no other nation enforces at all94) enforced against consumers,
employees, and other individuals. In short, the persuasiveness of the case
against the separability doctrine grows with the importance of (1) the
right to litigate and (2) the protection provided by contract law’s defenses
to enforcement. Each of these factors is generally less important in the
international context than in the domestic context, especially the domestic
adhesive context.
6. The Downsides of Repealing the Separability Doctrine
Repealing the separability doctrine would have downsides. A nonseparability rule would have a court available to resolve contract defenses
before an arbitrator resolves the merits of the claims. This would allow a
party to add an extra procedural step (litigating contract defenses) that
would generally make getting to arbitration of the cases’ merits slower
and costlier than it is under the separability doctrine, which resolves in
one forum both contract defenses and the merits of cases.95 In addition, a
non-separability rule would often have a court resolving issues
intertwined with the merits of the case that will go to the arbitrator if the
court finds no defense.96 In short, repealing the separability doctrine will
have downsides. However, ensuring that courts do not compel arbitration
unless the parties have formed an enforceable contract requiring
arbitration is worth bearing those downsides.
C. Vacate Legally Erroneous Arbitration Awards on Mandatory-Law
Claims
After contract defenses (the separability doctrine), the second important
and controversial topic on which current law enforces adhesive arbitration
agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts relates to the
adjudicator’s (court’s or arbitrator’s) errors of law.
94. Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL,
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 127, 138–40 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law
in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 865
(2002).
95. The non-separability procedure would allow a party who expects to lose in arbitration
to delay arbitration by fabricating an allegation that the container contract is unenforceable. See
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is easy to cry
fraud.”); W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 540 (1997)
(“[I]t is all too easy for a party seeking to derail an arbitration at its inception to claim that the
main agreement was or had become invalid.”). Perhaps parties who refuse to go to arbitration
without a court’s determination that the container contract is enforceable should, if they lose on
that determination, be required to pay the other side’s legal fees and costs. Additional sanctions
might also be imposed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
96. See Ware, supra note 48, at 114–17.
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1. Legally Erroneous Decisions by the Initial Adjudicator
Consider a hypothetical adhesion contract that does not have an
arbitration clause but rather provides that litigation of any disputes shall
end with the trial court’s judgment. In other words, the contract says the
parties have no right to appeal. This hypothetical contract provision
would be extremely unusual and probably unenforceable. Attorney Colter
Paulson searched for cases involving such provisions and concluded that
“[o]utside of the arbitration context, there are very few cases dealing with
pre-dispute waivers of the right to appeal.”97 In fact, Paulson found only
two cases since 1928, one of which he concluded “was simply a weak
attempt to call a payment provision an appellate waiver and was rejected
as such.”98 The other case involved an agreement that was not truly predispute,99 let alone pre-dispute and adhesive. Therefore, it seems no
reported case since 1928 involves a truly pre-dispute contract provision
prohibiting appeal.
The longstanding absence of cases involving pre-dispute agreements
prohibiting appeal suggests that such agreements are extremely unusual.
Their unusualness may be entirely due to party choice; perhaps parties
place great importance on the right to appeal, so they do not agree to give
it up. However, arbitration in the United States rarely provides a right to
appeal—appellate panels of arbitrators are very rare100—and many
parties nevertheless agree to arbitrate. So the fact that very few parties
form non-arbitration agreements prohibiting appeal suggests not that
parties oppose such agreements, but rather that parties do not believe that
courts would enforce such agreements.
Why would agreements not to appeal be unenforceable? Why would
it be so outlandish to enforce a pre-dispute contract term—even an
97. Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms
Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 492 (2013).
98. Id. at 492–93, 493 n.109.
99. See Burke v. Burke, 662 S.E.2d 622, 623, 627 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Paulson, supra note
97, at 493 n.108. The agreement in Burke was a property settlement agreement, in anticipation of
divorce, between spouses who had already separated. Burke, 662 S.E.2d at 623. The wife’s lawyer
drafted the agreement, and the husband was himself a lawyer. Id. While the Virginia Court of
Appeals enforced the agreement’s prohibition on appeal, this does not suggest it would have
enforced such a prohibition in a truly pre-dispute agreement, let alone an adhesive pre-dispute
agreement. See id. at 627. The Burke agreement was post-dispute in the sense that the parties had
decided to divorce and the agreement—as the name property settlement agreement suggests—
was more in the nature of a settlement agreement and received the high level of consent typically
received by settlement agreements. See id. at 623. It was not formed until examined by a lawyer
for each side. Id.
100. Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 710
(2001) (“[A]rbitration does not ordinarily provide a right to appeal. Although parties could, by
contract, agree to an appellate arbitral tribunal, such agreements are exceedingly rare.”).
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adhesive contract term—prohibiting appeal? After all, what is really so
important about appellate review? The primary purpose of appellate
review relates to law rather than facts. Trial courts find facts and apply
law to those facts.101 The primary purpose of appellate review is to ensure
that the trial court correctly applied the law to whatever facts the trial
court found, as opposed to policing the accuracy of the trial court’s factfinding, which is merely a secondary purpose of appellate review.102
While appellate courts usually give significant deference to trial courts’
factual findings, reversing only those that are “clearly erroneous,”
appellate courts give no deference to trial courts’ legal rulings and thus
give rulings of law de novo review.103 So the typical appeal of a trial
court’s decision centers on the appellant’s argument that the trial court
made an error of law.104
101. Martha S. Davis & Stevan Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals:
Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 536 n.393 (1986) (“[T]he trial court’s
function is application of law to fact.”).
102. Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1141 (2012) (“The near-exclusive focus on legal issues at the
appellate level suggests that the legal system of the United States primarily values appellate
review for its role in lawmaking. . . . [The system] devote[s] fewer appellate resources to this
review for factual errors.” (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND
ITS STUDY 36 (1930))); Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65
ALA. L. REV. 683, 707 (2013) (“Error correction is the other traditional function of appeals courts.
Generally, in American courts, the error-correction function is limited to issues of law, and trial
court decisions of fact are rarely reviewed.” (citing McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20
(1954)).
103. Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical
Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–8 (“The decisions in the first category—questions of law—are
reviewed ‘de novo’ by the appellate court, meaning that the appellate court is not required or
expected to give any deference to the trial court. . . . In contrast to legal conclusions, factual
determinations by the trial court are reviewed deferentially. Appellate review of factual findings
by the district court is limited to whether those findings are ‘clearly erroneous,’ a very high bar to
reverse a trial judge's factual findings.” (footnotes omitted)); David Frisch, Contractual Choice
of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 77 (2003)
(“Traditionally, questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact are reviewable only
on a clearly erroneous basis.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1831 (2013) (“Appellate courts review questions of law de
novo . . . . In contrast, appellate courts defer to trial court fact-finding . . . .” (citing J. ERIC
SMITHBURN, APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 8 (2009))); Leandra Lederman,
(Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1886 (2014) (“Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) governs the standard of review of findings of fact in district court bench
trials; Rule 52(a)(6) states that ‘[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.’ The standard of review on legal issues
appealed from the district courts is de novo.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
104. Anderson, supra note 103, at 8 (“The key point is that the standard of review constrains
the appellate court to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, meaning that the appeal is primarily
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Therefore, a contract clause prohibiting appeal would effectively trade
away the right to correct legally erroneous trial court decisions. Trial
courts sometimes make errors of law, and when that occurs a contract
clause prohibiting appeal would be the parties’ consent to enforcement of
that legally erroneous decision. Enforcing such a clause in a contract
formed pre-dispute is, as noted above, virtually unheard of, and the notion
of enforcing such a clause in an adhesion contract is even more
outlandish.
By contrast, courts routinely enforce such clauses in adhesive
arbitration agreements. That is, courts routinely enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements that trade away the right to correct legally
erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator, the arbitrator. In fact, most
every arbitration agreement does this. Most every arbitration agreement
trades away the right to correct legally erroneous decisions by the initial
adjudicator, as there is generally no right to correct legally erroneous
arbitration awards. As noted above, appellate panels of arbitrators are
very rare.105 And while trial courts’ legal rulings receive de novo review
from appellate courts,106 arbitrators’ legal rulings almost never receive de
novo review from courts and usually receive no review at all.107 As the
Supreme Court acknowledges, arbitration’s “absence of multilayered
review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”108 Courts
occasionally vacate an award on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law, but “manifest disregard” requires much more than
an error of law—it requires proof the arbitrator knew the law and chose

an appeal of legal issues, not a new trial of the whole case.”); Déirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil
and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 387 (2007) (“Appeal is usually
on the basis of error of law rather than fact.”); Peter J. Kocoras, The Proper Appellate Standard
of Review for Probable Cause to Issue a Search Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1993)
(“At the time of the appeal, the factual record has been constructed by the district court and settled
for purposes of appellate review, enabling appellate judges to ‘devote their primary attention to
legal issues.’” (footnote omitted)); Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Evaluating Appeals by the
Numbers, 66 TEX. B.J. 768, 770 (2003) (“In appeals following jury trials, the most valid
generalization is that issues of law succeed, and issues of fact and challenges to trial procedure do
not. An appeal is strongest when the alleged errors are errors of law, and it is generally good
strategy to emphasize those issues in the brief.”); Ten Cate, supra note 102.
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
108. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011); see also Bowles Fin.
Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Arbitration provides
neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper application of substantive law
offered by the judicial system.”).
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to ignore it109—so vacatur on this ground is “extremely rare.”110
Even when arbitration agreements say courts shall provide de novo
review of the arbitrator’s legal rulings, courts nevertheless should refuse
to provide de novo review, according to the Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.111 The Hall Street
Court refused to enforce a post-dispute arbitration agreement providing
that
‘[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon
may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming
the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award.
The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i)
where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s
conclusions of law are erroneous.’112

109. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall
Street Associates, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 604 (2013) (“Most courts agree that
manifest disregard applies only in exceptional circumstances; it does not refer to mere error by
arbitrators on the law or questionable arbitrator interpretations of the contract. The classical
formulation is that it pertains to a situation in which the arbitrators describe the applicable law
cogently and knowledgeably and then deliberately ignore it in reaching their determination.”
(footnote omitted)). The manifest-disregard doctrine applies “when the arbitrators ‘knew the law
and explicitly disregarded it.’ This is the predominant definition of the manifest disregard
standard.” Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error: Replacing “Manifest Disregard” With a New
Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 95 (2012) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x. 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme
Court’s Hall Street decision “brought into question whether the . . . Court, by implication,
abolished the manifest disregard standard. The Court, however, did not decide this issue.” Id. at
91. “While several of the circuits uphold the use of the manifest disregard doctrine, each of these
circuits has a slightly different definition for manifest disregard, and all of these interpretations
seem a bit narrower than the interpretations that existed before Hall Street.” Weathers P. Bolt,
Note, Much Ado About Nothing: The Effect of Manifest Disregard on Arbitration Agreement
Decisions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 161, 167 (2011).
110. S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and
U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 189–90 (2012) (“It is
extremely rare for a party to establish a manifest disregard of law . . . . As a practical matter,
claims of manifest disregard of law very seldom result in the setting aside of an award.”); see
Bolt, supra note 109, at 174 (“[M]anifest disregard is the most common ground for appeal of an
arbitral ruling, yet it is remarkably unsuccessful.”); Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal
Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143,
164 (2013) (“[M]anifest-disregard review is effectively a dead letter, whether one is in state or
federal court.”); Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 16 (2014) (“The [manifest disregard] standard has
been described . . . as a ‘virtually insurmountable’ hurdle, and even courts recognize the limited
utility of the doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
111. 552 U.S. 576, 584–85 (2008).
112. Id. at 579 (alteration in original).
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The Supreme Court decided against enforcing such agreements,
which the Court characterized as attempts to expand the grounds for
vacatur beyond those listed in the Federal Arbitration Act.113 The Hall
Street Court stated that the FAA’s four grounds for vacatur are
“exclusive,” so courts should not enforce contractually created grounds
for vacatur.114 The Court viewed the FAA’s provisions on confirmation
and vacatur of arbitration awards “as substantiating a national policy
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”115 Any
other reading of the FAA, Hall Street said, “opens the door to the fullbore legal and evidentiary appeals that can ‘rende[r] informal arbitration
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial
review process,’ and bring arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration
process.”116
While refusal to enforce agreements providing for judicial vacatur of
legally erroneous arbitration awards is yet another problematic117
arbitration ruling by the post-2006 Supreme Court, especially its
conservative Justices,118 the broader reluctance of courts to engage in
close review of arbitrators’ legal rulings is longstanding. For well over a
century, courts have reviewed arbitration awards very deferentially and
thus have confirmed and enforced, rather than vacated, most of them,
including awards in which the arbitrator may have made an error of
law.119 Before the FAA, the general rule for judicial review of arbitration
awards was: “If the award is within the [arbitration agreement], and
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law
or fact.”120 On this point of law, little has changed, as the FAA’s grounds
113. Id. at 586–87.
114. Id. at 582 & n.4, 584.
115. Id. at 588.
116. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. PrudentialBache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)).
117. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 56, 92–96 (2014).
118. Hall Street had five Republican appointees in the majority (Scalia, Roberts, Souter,
Thomas, Alito) and only one Democratic appointee (Ginsburg). Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578.
119. Ware, supra note 117, at 69.
120. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854); see also In re Curtis, 30 A. 769, 772 (Conn.
1894) (ruling that courts refuse to set aside an arbitration award “except for partiality and
corruption in the arbitrators, mistakes on their own principles, or fraud or misbehavior in the
parties”); Sherfy v. Graham, 72 Ill. 158, 159–60 (1874) (stating that arbitrators, “by the
submission, become judges, by the choice of the parties, both of the law and the fact, and from
their decision there is no appeal or review, of any decision made by them within the scope of their
powers, unless it be for fraud, partiality or misconduct.”); Pulliam v. Pensoneau, 33 Ill. 374, 378
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for vacating awards are narrow and do not include “error of law” by the
arbitrator.121 With Hall Street holding that the FAA’s grounds for vacatur
are “exclusive,”122 there is every reason to believe that courts will
continue to confirm arbitration awards without determining whether they
correctly apply the law or rest on errors of law.123
In effect then, an arbitration agreement trades away the right to correct
legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator (the arbitrator).124
Current law routinely enforces such agreements, even when they are part
of adhesion contracts.125 In this respect, current law enforces adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than it enforces other adhesion
contracts.126 Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements, but
not other adhesion contracts, that purport to trade away the right to correct
legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator.127
If the arbitrator’s error of law resulted in the arbitration award denying
a claim that would have prevailed under a correct decision of law, then
the arbitration agreement had the effect of negating that claim. In that
situation, a claim that would have won, but for a pre-dispute contract
clause, in fact loses because that clause is enforced. Thus, the arbitration
clause had the same effect as an enforceable exculpatory clause—a predispute contract clause negating a claim that might later occur. However,
exculpatory clauses are generally not enforced with respect to most
claims arising out of tort or statutory law.128 In particular, courts are
especially unlikely to enforce exculpatory clauses to negate claims
arising out of areas of law (such as consumer, employment, labor,
(1864) (stating that the decision of the arbitrator is conclusive on the parties, and a mistake in
either law or fact is not usually corrected).
121. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (omitting “error of law” from listed grounds for vacatur); Jay E.
Grenig, After the Arbitration Award: Not Always Final and Binding, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
65, 99 (2014) (“Review of an arbitration award is limited. A court may vacate an arbitrator’s
decision only in very unusual circumstances.”); Benjamin A. Griffith, Comment, Contractual
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards in Missouri After Hall Street and Cable
Connection, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 265, 277 (2013) (“Congress established narrow grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards under § 10 of the FAA. The language of § 10 has been
interpreted to not allow review of arbitral awards for errors of law or fact. As a result, if the arbitral
award does not violate one of the four provisions of § 10, the reviewing court is required by the
FAA to confirm it.” (footnotes omitted)).
122. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584.
123. Ware, supra note 117, at 92–96.
124. Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 201 (“By contracting
to arbitrate, parties are essentially contracting out of the right to appeal.”).
125. See discussion supra Subsections I.B.1, I.C.1.
126. See Ware, supra note 2, at 751.
127. Id. at 746–48. An arbitration agreement basically consents to enforcement of the
arbitrator’s legally erroneous decisions. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text.
128. Ware, supra note 2, at 728.
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securities, and franchise law) designed to override contract terms
(“mandatory-law claims”).129
With respect to mandatory-law claims, current arbitration law is
anomalous. Combining enforcement of adhesive agreements to arbitrate
statutory and other mandatory-law claims with judicial review that is too
deferential to identify and vacate legally erroneous arbitration awards
results in enforcement of adhesion contracts to negate claims that could
not be negated directly with exculpatory clauses because courts would
not enforce them. In this important and controversial respect, arbitration
law enforces adhesion contracts more broadly than other law does.
Arbitration law enforces effectively exculpatory clauses when other law
would not enforce an exculpatory clause. Thus, arbitration law has a
lower standard of consent than other law because, while other law
requires post-dispute consent (a settlement agreement130) to negate a
mandatory-law claim, arbitration law tolerates pre-dispute consent, even
adhesive consent, to negate a mandatory-law claim.
While enforcing contracts trading away purportedly mandatory-law
claims, and thus transforming those ostensibly mandatory rules into
default rules,131 appeals to my general preference for default rather than
mandatory law, I nevertheless believe those of us who are against
mandatory law should seek to repeal it directly.132 To be consistent with
non-arbitration law generally, arbitration law must stop allowing predispute arbitration clauses to have the effect of enforceable exculpatory
clauses in circumstances in which non-arbitration exculpatory clauses
would be unenforceable. If mandatory laws are to be repealed, that should
be accomplished by the legislatures that enacted them, not by adhesive
arbitration agreements.
2. The Anomaly Only Exists with Respect to Mandatory-Law Claims
Arising out of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
(Settlement Agreements vs. Exculpatory Clauses)
The anomaly of current law enforcing adhesive arbitration
agreements, but not other adhesion contracts that trade away the right to
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1999).
132. Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 117 n.93 (2006) (“As an aside, I feel compelled
to add that I oppose much of the mandatory law enacted since the FAA so I am sort of pleased
that arbitration now allows parties to opt out of such law. But I believe candor and logical
consistency require those of us who oppose mandatory law to seek to repeal it outright, not to use
arbitration to make an end run around it.”).
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correct legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator, is an
anomaly only with respect to legally erroneous decisions on questions of
mandatory (as opposed to default) rules of law.
As noted above, a default rule is a legal rule that governs in the
absence of an enforceable contract term to the contrary.133 For example,
in a sale of goods under the UCC, the default rule is that the seller’s place
of business is the place for delivery of the goods, but the parties can opt
out of that default with a contract term requiring delivery at some other
location.134 If the parties’ contract does not specify a place for delivery
but has an arbitration clause, then the contract allows the arbitrator to
determine the place for delivery. If the arbitrator does not correctly apply
the UCC and concludes the place of delivery is somewhere other than the
seller’s place of business, the arbitrator has made a legally erroneous
ruling, but one to which the parties should be held because the parties’
contract delegated their lawmaking discretion over default rules to their
agent, the arbitrator.135 Just as the parties would be held to a pre-dispute
contract term in which they expressly chose someplace other than the
seller’s place as their place for delivery, they should be held to a predispute contract term giving their arbitrator the power to choose
someplace other than the seller’s place as their place for delivery, even if
the arbitrator exercised that power by making an error of law.136
In contrast, if the arbitrator erroneously decides an issue of mandatory
law then the parties should not be held to the arbitrator’s decision, even
if the parties’ pre-dispute contract (including the arbitration clause)
authorized and supported that decision. Many statutes and regulations in
consumer, employment, and other areas of law prohibit enforcement of
various contract terms.137 In other words, these laws restrict freedom of
contract. They prohibit parties from producing certain results by contract.
For example, if the relevant statute prohibits interest rates above 24%,
then the parties may not lawfully contract for 36% interest.138 But
133. Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 733 (1993).
134. U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
135. See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In
the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate may do anything the parties
may do directly.”).
136. This freedom to make privatized default law allows parties to develop legal rules
different from, and perhaps better than, the government rules of law they are exiting.
137. Ware, supra note 2, at 716–17.
138. See Beltz v. Dings, 6 P.3d 424, 430 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to enforce a contract
for a deed between two individuals with a 1% interest rate per month because it exceeded the
state’s allowable maximum annual rate of 10.33%); NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital,
LLC, 84 A.3d 800, 806 (R.I. 2014) (refusing to enforce a contract with 23.17% interest rate
because Rhode Island’s usury statute prohibits rates above 21%).
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suppose their contract does require 36% interest and an arbitration award
enforces that requirement. The arbitrator has erred on an issue of
mandatory law. If a trial court made that error of law, then an appellate
court would presumably reverse the trial court’s judgment to correct the
error. Further, as noted above, an adhesion contract purporting to trade
away the right to correct the legally erroneous trial court decision would
be unenforceable.139 Similarly, an adhesive arbitration agreement should
be unenforceable to the extent it would prevent courts from correcting the
arbitrator’s error of enforcing a 36% interest rate, or any other arbitrator
errors on questions of mandatory law.
This anomaly of enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements, but not
other adhesion contracts trading away the right to correct legally
erroneous decisions on mandatory law, was not a significant issue before
the 1980s, because courts of that era generally did not enforce pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under mandatory law. Courts
largely limited pre-1980s arbitration to disputes governed by the default
rules of contract and commercial law.140 A pre-1980s arbitration award
on a mandatory-law claim was apparently pretty rare and would generally
only occur as a result of a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.
Distinguishing between pre- and post-dispute agreements regarding
mandatory law is crucial. While, as noted above, a pre-dispute agreement
negating a mandatory law claim is an exculpatory clause, a post-dispute
agreement negating a mandatory law claim is a settlement agreement.
Courts routinely enforce settlement agreements to negate mandatory-law
claims—even unsophisticated or vulnerable parties’ settlement
agreements to negate mandatory-law claims—outside the arbitration law
context.141 Courts enforce “legally erroneous” settlement agreements by
routinely enforcing settlement agreements without asking whether their
terms are similar to the result a court would have reached had the case
not settled.142 As post-dispute arbitration agreements are a type of
settlement agreement, by enforcing legally erroneous arbitration awards
arising out of post-dispute arbitration agreements, pre-1980s law
139. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.1.
140. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this era, arbitration was used “almost entirely in either the area
of labor disputes or in ‘ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact.’” Id. at 650
(quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 281 (1926)). Arbitrators in these two contexts hear almost nothing but breach-ofcontract claims. In the labor context, a union or employee asserts breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. In the commercial context, merchants allege breach of contracts for the sale of goods
and raise “questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of
payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like.” Id. at 646 n.11.
141. Ware, supra note 2, at 727–29.
142. Ware, supra note 117, at 64–66.
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enforced arbitration agreements and non-arbitration agreements similarly
with respect to post-dispute agreements to resolve a dispute on terms
quite different from those a court would have chosen.143
Pre-1980s law was also generally consistent across arbitration and
non-arbitration agreements in not enforcing pre-dispute agreements, let
alone adhesive agreements, trading away the right to appeal legally
erroneous decisions on mandatory law.144 This changed from 1985 to
1991, when the Supreme Court decided cases in which it enforced predispute agreements to arbitrate several important mandatory-law claims
(antitrust, securities, and employment discrimination),145 but retained
deferential judicial review of arbitration awards, even those involving
mandatory-law claims. This created the anomaly of enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements—even adhesive pre-dispute arbitration
agreements—trading away the right to appeal legally erroneous decisions
on mandatory law, while denying enforcement of pre-dispute nonarbitration agreements trading away the right to appeal legally erroneous
decisions on mandatory law. This anomaly should be fixed for the sake
of the law’s internal coherence,146 regardless of one’s beliefs about the
frequency with which arbitrators make legally erroneous decisions on
mandatory law.147
One way to fix this anomaly would be to reverse or override the
Court’s 1985–1991 decisions enforcing pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate mandatory-law claims. This “turn back the clock” approach is
part of the Very Progressive Position, which would not enforce predispute arbitration agreements by individuals.148 This approach is
overbroad because it would deny individuals the freedom to form
enforceable pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under
default rules of law, and because even individuals’ pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under mandatory rules of law
143. See id. at 58.
144. See id.
145. The important cases were: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (Securities Exchange Act and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (employment discrimination). Their predecessor was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974), but it stood alone for over a decade and seemed narrowly confined to the special
concerns of international cases.
146. See Ware, supra note 132, at 117.
147. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 194
(2006) (“‘[H]ow often’ do arbitrators not follow the law? The empirical evidence on this point—
which consists of case analyses, surveys of arbitrators, and reversal rates of arbitration awards
and court decisions—is varied but ultimately inconclusive.” (footnote omitted)).
148. Ware, supra note 2, at 733–34.
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should be enforced so long as arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory law are
adequately policed by judicial review.
Rather than the Very Progressive Position’s overbroad approach of
returning to pre-1980s law, a better tailored (and more centrist) way to fix
the anomaly of uncorrected, legally erroneous decisions on mandatory
law is to start correcting them. Courts could give de novo review to
arbitrators’ decisions on questions of mandatory law. I have long
supported this149 and propose the following law reform, whether enacted
by Congress, the CFPB, or perhaps the Supreme Court150:
In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration
awards, a state or federal court shall vacate an award arising
out of an agreement providing for arbitration of any future
dispute between the parties where the award was based on
the arbitrators’ error of law and, at the time of their most
recent agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration,
the parties could not have formed an enforceable contract to
avoid such law.151
The final clause—“at the time of their most recent agreement
submitting the controversy to arbitration, the parties could not have
formed an enforceable contract to avoid such law”152—ensures that only
awards arising out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate would be subject
to de novo review, and ensures that de novo review would apply only to
questions of mandatory, not default, law. This rule would fix the anomaly
of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even adhesive arbitration
agreements, but not other pre-dispute contracts trading away the right to
appeal legally erroneous decisions. This rule would make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other agreements, but not more so.
D. Enforce Arbitral Class Waivers No More or Less Than Non-Arbitral
Class Waivers
In addition to contract defenses (the separability doctrine) and
vacating legally erroneous decisions on mandatory law, the third
important and controversial topic on which current law enforces adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts is
“class waivers;” that is, contract terms trading away (not technically

149. Ware, supra note 131, at 727.
150. This centrist proposal might be the best resolution of tension between the FAA and at
least federal law creating mandatory-law rights, i.e., rights purportedly inalienable pre-dispute.
151. Ware, supra note 2, at 752.
152. Id.
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“waiving”153) the right to be part of a class action. This Section first
analyzes the law governing class waivers and then suggests that
arbitration law should refrain from taking a side in the ongoing policy
battles over class actions.
1. Class Waivers and the Black-Letter Law of Concepcion and Amex
The following Sections analyze the black-letter law governing class
waivers by discussing the two important cases in which the Supreme
Court made this law. The first deals with arbitration law’s relationship
to state law, while the second deals with arbitration law’s relationship to
federal law.
a. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Before 2011, courts were split on the enforceability of class waivers
in arbitration agreements (“arbitral class waivers”). Some courts enforced
them to preclude both litigation and classwide arbitration, thus leaving
only individual arbitration to resolve claims covered by an arbitration
agreement with a class waiver.154 In contrast, other courts refused, often
153. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 205 (2004).
One can alienate one’s rights in two ways: in exchange for consideration or in
the absence of consideration. To put it another way, one can trade away one’s
rights, or one can give away one’s rights. In some legal contexts, such as contract
law, the term “waiver” is often used to refer only to giving away one’s rights.
Standard accounts of contract law, for example, carefully distinguish the
“waiver” of contractual rights, which does not require consideration, from the
“modification” of contractual rights, which does.
Id. at 169 n.16. For this reason, “class waiver” is a misleading term to the extent “waiver” implies
alienating a right for nothing in return; if the alienating occurs through a contract term, then it is
better understood as a trade than a waiver.
154. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877–78 (11th
Cir. 2005); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v.
Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank,
225 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); Borrero v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. CIV S-10-322 KJM, 2010
WL 4054114, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2129
ADM/JJG, 2010 WL 3702592, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2010), rev’d in part on other grounds,
653 F.3d 766 (2011); Johnson v. Carmax, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-213, 2010 WL 2802478, at *3–4
(E.D. Va. July 14, 2010); Jackson v. Payday Loan Store of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 4189, 2010 WL
1031590, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010); Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-cv918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008); Deaton v. Overstock.com, Inc.,
No. 07-cv-643-JPG, 2007 WL 4569874, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2007); Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v.
Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); Maiorano v. Prof’l Cmty. Mgmt., Inc., No. B220127, 2010
WL 3786721, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23
P.3d 1249, 1253–54 (Colo. App. 2001); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1260–61
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 750 (Md. 2005); Gras v.
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on unconscionability grounds, to enforce many arbitral class waivers.155
For instance, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,156 the California
Supreme Court said:
We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily
unconscionable. But when the waiver is found in a consumer
contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between
the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of
damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent
the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another.” Under these circumstances,
such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.157
The California Supreme Court’s quote from a California statute
prohibiting exculpatory clauses is telling. The strongest argument against
class waivers is that they are often effectively exculpatory clauses. This
Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Ranieri v. Bell
Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND,
693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005); Autonation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 202 (Tex.
App. 2003); Bandler v. Charter One Bank, No. 451-7-03 Rdcv, 2010 WL 3617115, 11–12 (Super.
Ct. Vt. 2010), rev’d, 59 A.3d 157 (Vt. 2012); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-105(1) (West
2015) (stating that “a creditor may contract with the debtor of an open-end consumer credit
contract for a waiver by the debtor of the right to initiate or participate in a class action related to
the open-end consumer credit contract”).
155. See, e.g., Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2010); Dale v.
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d
1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Jones v.
DirecTV, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp.,
229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539
(Ala. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815–16 (Ct. App. 2006),
abrogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 243 (Ct.
App. 2005); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns,
Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach,
Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006), superseded by statute, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012), as recognized in
Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191 (2012); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d
859, 866–67 (Ohio 1998); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 283 (W. Va. 2002).
156. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
157. Id. at 87 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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argument can be made as a matter of doctrine (class waivers are
unenforceable when they have exculpatory effect) or as a matter of policy
(class waivers should be unenforceable when they have exculpatory
effect).
The Supreme Court rejected the doctrinal version of this argument in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.158 The Concepcion decision held that
the just-quoted “Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”159
Concepcion involved a federal court’s application of the Discover Bank
rule to hold unconscionable an arbitration clause in a consumer’s cellphone contract.160 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the FAA did not preempt the Discover Bank rule, because that rule
was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to
contracts generally in California”161 and thus fell within the savings
clause at the end of FAA § 2, which states that arbitration agreements
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”162
The Supreme Court’s majority, consisting entirely of Republicanappointed Justices, disagreed.163 It said, “The overarching purpose of the
FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”164 The Court’s reasoning relied on the premise
that an important purpose of the FAA was to enforce agreements in which
parties choose the more streamlined process (arbitration) over the more
elaborate process (litigation). Concepcion suggested that the FAA would
preempt (hypothetical) state law deeming unconscionable arbitration
agreements lacking “judicially monitored discovery,”165 “adherence to
the Federal Rules of Evidence,”166 or “arbitration-by-jury”167 because
requiring arbitration to include these aspects of litigation would
effectively convert the more streamlined process into the more elaborate
process. Thus, it would no longer be “arbitration,” as those who enacted
158. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
159. Id. at 352.
160. Id. at 336–38.
161. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Shroyer v.
New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
162. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
163. Four Justices joined the opinion, with Justice Clarence Thomas concurring in the result
and expressing a view to the Right of the other four Republican appointees. See Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that FAA § 2 “does not include all defenses
applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses”).
164. Id. at 344.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 349 n.7.
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the FAA envisioned that process.168 Similarly, the Court said, “Requiring
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.”169
In all this, Concepcion built on an earlier anti-class-arbitration
decision, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,170 which
also had a majority consisting entirely of the Court’s five Republicanappointees.171 Quoting Stolt, the Concepcion Court said:
“[C]hanges brought about by the shift from bilateral
arbitration
to
class-action
arbitration”
are
“fundamental.” . . . The conclusion follows that class
arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.
First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to
generate procedural morass than final judgment. . . .
Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. The
[American Arbitration Association’s] rules governing class
arbitrations mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
class litigation. . . .
. . . [I]t is at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator
would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due
process rights are satisfied.
Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants.
Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence
of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will
go uncorrected. . . .
. . . We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the
company with no effective means of review, and even harder
to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state
courts to force such a decision.172
168. The Concepcion Court said that “[p]arties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation.
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations. But
what the parties in the aforementioned examples would have agreed to is not arbitration as
envisioned by the FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state law.” Id. at
351 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 344.
170. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
171. Id. at 665.
172. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347–51 (citation omitted) (quoting Stolt, 559 U.S. at 686).
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In sum, the conservative Justices comprising the majorities in Stolt
and Concepcion see “bilateral” arbitration—the simple type of arbitration
contemplated by the FAA—as the norm and see class arbitration as a
strange process that a few parties might choose, but which should not be
imposed on parties who have agreed to arbitrate without specifically
addressing class arbitration. And Concepcion strongly suggests that
courts may not consider it a strike against the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement that the agreement provides only for arbitration and
not for class arbitration, even if that has exculpatory effect. Concepcion
reads the FAA as preempting state law—even state law categorized as
“unconscionability” or some other ground for the revocation of any
contract—that “[r]equir[es] the availability of classwide arbitration.”173
b. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
While Concepcion was a case of federal law (the FAA) preempting
state law that otherwise would have invalidated an adhesive arbitral class

If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be bound by the
arbitration. For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation,
class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class
members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and a right to opt out of the class. At least this amount of process would
presumably be required for absent parties to be bound by the results of
arbitration.
We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the
disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator. Indeed, class
arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in
1925; as the California Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank, class
arbitration is a “relatively recent development.”
Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 344; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). Shortly after Concepcion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of
lower courts that had found arbitration agreement class waivers unconscionable and had then
permitted class litigation. See Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir.
2010) (concluding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that, under Stolt, the
court could not force class arbitration when the arbitration agreement was silent), vacated sub
nom. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 564 U.S. 1001 (2011); Brewer v. Mo. Title
Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010) (striking a consumer title loan class arbitration waiver
and the arbitration agreement requiring arbitration on an individual basis, leaving the consumer
with the option of bringing a class action in court), vacated, 563 U.S. 971 (2011). For postConcepcion cases, see Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 606 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Concepcion]
prohibited courts from altering otherwise valid arbitration agreements by applying the doctrine of
unconscionability to eliminate a term barring classwide procedures.”); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673
F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the FAA preempts Washington state law invalidating
class-action waivers as substantively unconscionable).
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waiver, the 2013 case of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant174 was the FAA trumping other federal law that would have
invalidated an adhesive arbitral class waiver. Plaintiffs in Amex brought
antitrust class litigation despite an arbitral class waiver in their
agreements with the defendant.175 While the district court dismissed the
suits and ordered individual arbitrations, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, based in part on a declaration from an
economist who estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to
prove the antitrust claims would be “‘at least several hundred thousand
dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for
an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.”176
The Second Circuit stated that because “the class action waiver in this
case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights, we find the
arbitration provision unenforceable.”177
In short, the Second Circuit held that the class waiver was effectively
an exculpatory clause and for that reason should not be enforced. Unlike
the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank, the Second Circuit in
Amex did not point to a statute prohibiting exculpatory clauses. However,
the doctrine on which the Second Circuit relied—the judicially created
doctrine invalidating arbitration clauses that prevent effective vindication
of federal statutory rights—is substantively similar.178 While this
“effective vindication” doctrine invalidating arbitration clauses with
exculpatory effect shares much in common with the unconscionability
doctrine, it is distinct because it is based not on state law but rather on the
fact that federal antitrust law is weakened by enforcement of arbitral class
waivers.179 In other words, the Second Circuit perceived tension among
federal statutes and resolved that tension in favor of the antitrust statutes
(the Sherman and Clayton Acts) and against the FAA.
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s now-familiar five-Justice
conservative majority resolved this tension in favor of the FAA and
against the antitrust statutes. In reversing the Second Circuit’s decision,
the Supreme Court in Amex said:
[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving
a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the
right to pursue that remedy. The class-action waiver merely
limits arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more
eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
Id. at 2308.
Id.
In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011).
See WARE, supra note 6, at 76.
Id. at 76–77.
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remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class
action for legal relief in 1938. Or, to put it differently, the
individual suit that was considered adequate to assure
“effective vindication” of a federal right before adoption of
class-action procedures did not suddenly become
“ineffective vindication” upon their adoption.180
In this passage, the Supreme Court does not dispute that the class
waiver was effectively an exculpatory clause. And as a matter of doctrine
(as distinguished from policy) Amex makes a plausible, perhaps even
strong, argument for enforcing the class waiver despite its exculpatory
effect. In sum, Concepcion and Amex indicate that courts will generally
enforce even exculpatory adhesive arbitral class waivers until a statute,
regulation, or new Supreme Court majority tells them not to.
2. Arbitration Law Should Not Be a Combatant in the “Holy War” over
Class Actions
Before Concepcion and Amex, courts rarely enforced class waivers in
non-arbitration adhesion contracts (“non-arbitral class waivers”).181
Concepcion and Amex made adhesive arbitration agreements more
enforceable than other adhesion contracts with respect to class waivers.182
180. American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
181. Compare Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 WL 1704469, at *21
(W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), In re Yahoo! Litig., 251
F.R.D. 459, 469–70 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to hold a non-arbitral class waiver enforceable as
a matter of law in a commercial case and denying a motion for summary judgment pending “more
developed evidentiary record”), Elhilu v. Quizno’s Franchising Co., No. 2:06-cv-07855-FMCCTx, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109435, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008) (invalidating a non-arbitral
class waiver), and Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 702 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No.
06–cv–02358-CMA-KLM, 2009 WL 1068744, at *22 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (enforcing a nonarbitral class waiver).
Some courts did enforce forum-selection clauses choosing a forum that did not permit class
actions. See, e.g., Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (D. Md. 2000) (concluding
that the unavailability of class actions in Virginia is an insufficient reason to refuse to enforce
Virginia forum-selection clause); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C.
2002); Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam);
Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464–65 (Md. 1997).
182. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use
of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 964 (2014) (“Unlike
arbitral class waivers, nonarbitral class waivers likely remain subject to state unconscionability
challenges.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-ACenter, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 389
(2011) (“The [Concepcion] Court majority could . . . [have struck] down the arbitration provision
[with its class waiver], paving the way for a class action in court. Had there been a class-action
waiver without the arbitration provision, that would presumably have been the result.”); Maureen
A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 782–84
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Concepcion and Amex allowed businesses to do with adhesive arbitration
agreements what other adhesion contracts generally could not do: contain
enforceable pre-dispute class waivers.
Since Concepcion and Amex, however, most courts faced with
adhesive non-arbitral class waivers seem to be enforcing them.183 This
change suggests the Supreme Court’s enforcement of adhesive arbitral
class waivers is encouraging courts to enforce non-arbitral class
waivers—which, before Concepcion and Amex, they would not have.
This seems to be an example of the tail wagging the dog. Rather than
arbitration law (the tail) influencing law on class actions, including
waivers of them (the dog), arbitration law on class waivers should defer
to non-arbitration law on class waivers.184 If non-arbitration law on class
actions should be changed, then it should be changed directly (whether
by case law, statute, or regulation) rather than through arbitration law
influencing it.
Class actions have been controversial since they first proliferated in
the 1970s—a time when Professor Arthur Miller described a “holy war”
in which one side saw the class action as a knight in shining armor, while
the other side saw it as a “Frankenstein” monster.185 Not much has
(2012) (discussing cases upholding class action waivers based on FAA preemption even if state
law would invalidate such waivers); U.S. Supreme Court Issues Significant New Decision
Regarding Class Action Litigation, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Apr. 28, 2011),
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/pdfsearch/wsgralert_cl
ass_action_litigation.htm (“While class waivers outside of arbitration agreements are likely not
valid in California and many other states, [Concepcion] provides powerful ammunition to
companies that would prefer to resolve claims through individual arbitration rather than through
the court system” (footnote omitted)).
183. Compare Grant v. Convergys Corp., No. 4:12-CV-496 (CEJ), 2013 WL 781898, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2013) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton
Homes, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver),
Birdsong v. AT&T Corp., No. C12–6175 TEH, 2013 WL 1120783, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), Killion v. KeHE, 885 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882, 885
(N.D. Ohio 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), and Palmer v. Convergys Corp., No.
7:10-cv-145 (HL), 2012 WL 425256, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class
waiver).
184. See supra note 181.
185. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665 (1979). See also DEBORAH HENSLER ET
AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 35 (2000) (describing efforts in the 1990s to revise Rule 23, and
finding that “[a]lthough the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s had brought new ingredients to
the debate over damage class actions, the thousands of pages of comment and testimony on the
Advisory Committee’s proposals echo the three decades of controversy that preceded its efforts
to revise Rule 23”); JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGURD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 531 (1998) (“No other federal rule of civil procedure has generated as much
debate, or as much division, as Rule 23.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New
Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
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changed throughout several decades of this “holy war,” and this war is
not likely to end anytime soon. As Professor Deborah Hensler et al.
explain, whether the benefits of class actions outweigh their costs “is a
deeply political question, implicating fundamental beliefs about the
structure of the political system, the nature of society, and the roles of
courts and law in society. . . . [T]his political question is . . . unlikely to
be resolved soon.”186
Those who dislike class actions presumably appreciate Concepcion
and Amex for enforcing class waivers that likely reduce class actions,
while defenders of class actions criticize Concepcion and Amex for the
same reason.187 In short, debate over Concepcion and Amex enforcing
L. 179, 180 (2001) (describing the debate on class actions, and noting that “[t]oday there is again
a sense that monsters are loose in the land,” where courts are overrun with class action litigation);
Edward F. Sherman, Decline & Fall, ABA J., June 2007, at 51, http://www.abajournal.com/mag
azine/article/decline_fall/ (“The rise and fall of consumer class actions is a cycle that began in
1966 when the scope of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was expanded to allow
class action suits for damages. . . . [I]n addition to causing consternation in the business sector,
the increase in class actions ignited an intense debate over whether the social benefits of class
actions outweigh their costs.”).
186. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 185, at 471–72.
187. Some scholars suggest that Concepcion and Amex enable adhesion contracts’ class
waivers to virtually end consumer (and perhaps employment) class actions. See, e.g., Myriam
Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, CrowdClassing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 458–62
(2014); Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005) (arguing that “collective action
waiver[s]” have the potential to “bar the majority of class actions as we know them”); Ann C.
Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1682, 1688 (2014); Marc J. Mandich, Comment, AT&T v. Concepcion: The End of the Modern
Consumer Class, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 205, 206 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–05, 727 (2012)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Tsunami] (“Thus, Concepcion has caused a tsunami wave that is
threatening to eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their substantive
rights by participating in class actions.”); id. at 725 (“We should not allow companies to shortcut
the legislative process by using arbitration to abolish class actions.”); Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally
Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2012) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory Binding];
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, SFGATE (Nov. 7, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-could-end-class-actionsuits-3246898.php; Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes Consumers’ Rights in Most ProCorporate Decision Since Citizens United, THINKPROGRESS: JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2011, 3:40 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/04/27/176997/scotus-nukes-consumers/. But see Rutledge
& Drahozal, supra note 182, at 961 (“Our central finding is consistent across both samples of
franchise agreements: the predicted tsunami of arbitral class waivers has not occurred.”). Perhaps
to some extent non-class action alternatives for consumer plaintiffs can or will produce something
very similar to the class action. See Myriam E. Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based
Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1220–28 (2012) (discussing
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class waivers may be little more than a rather predictable application of
the broader debate about class actions. So the battle over class waivers
may be as intractable as the broader “holy war” over class actions.188 And
arbitration law is caught in the crossfire.
Rather than remain in the crossfire of the battle over class waivers,
arbitration law should leave the battlefield and be a non-combatant to
protect itself from further injury. Rather than join the anti-class-action
army (as Concepcion and Amex arguably did) or join the pro-class-action
army (as the Arbitration Fairness Act proposes189), arbitration law should
be neutral on class actions and class waivers. Arbitration law is not the
body of law that should decide whether class waivers are enforceable.
That is because arbitration law is not centrally concerned with class
actions, which are part of the law of civil procedure. Debates over class
actions are traditionally and appropriately held in the context of proposed
amendments to the federal and state rules of civil procedure.190 The fact
that Congress enacted arbitration law’s dominant statute, the FAA, before
the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,191 which was
well before the Federal Rules’ 1966 revision of Rule 23 blessing class
actions, confirms arbitration law’s separateness from these debates.192
More recently, Congress has continued its practice of enacting statutes
addressing class actions without addressing arbitration law.193 State
legislatures have even addressed the enforceability of class waivers: Utah
permits their enforcement, while California opposes their enforcement.194
the use of alternative avenues for claimants to seek redress in light of the decline in class action
remedies); Gilles & Sebok, supra, at 468, 473; David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s
Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
& REFORM 1151, 1153 (2013).
188. See Miller, supra note 185, at 664.
189. See H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013).
190. See, e.g., Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 187, at 720 & n.85.
191. See Chandler, supra note 28, at 348, 512; Mandich, supra note 187, at 210.
192. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 238 (1987) (describing the 1966 revisions to Rule 23).
193. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (limiting, among other things, the
number of lawsuits an individual can serve as a class representative, establishing rules for the
appointment of the lead plaintiff, and prohibiting class representatives from receiving special
compensation); Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (allowing defendants to remove a larger number of
class action lawsuits to federal court and increasing judicial scrutiny on so-called “coupon
settlements,” where class members receive a coupon for discounts from the settling defendant).
194. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-3-104 (West 2015) (“[A] creditor may contract with
the debtor of a closed-end consumer contract for a waiver by the debtor of the right to initiate or
participate in a class action related to the closed-end consumer contract.”), with CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1751 (West 2016) (“Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public
policy and shall be unenforceable and void.”).
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Finally, outside of arbitration law, courts have created case law precedent
by deciding whether to enforce non-arbitral class waivers.195 Thus, we
have three non-arbitration-law fora—amendments to rules of civil
procedure, statutes, and case law—in which to make law about class
actions generally and class waivers specifically. Any or all of these fora
are better suited to making that law than is arbitration law.
Accordingly, arbitration law should be agnostic about class waivers
and should defer to these other bodies of law. This Article’s centrist
proposal does exactly that. The proposal in the Appendix states that if any
arbitration “agreement requires claims to be brought on an individual,
rather than class, basis then such requirement shall be as enforceable as
such a requirement in a non-arbitration agreement would be under similar
circumstances.”196 This does not say that arbitral class waivers should or
should not be enforceable. It says that arbitration law should follow other
law on the circumstances in which they are enforceable. In short, it says
arbitration law should defer to other law in deciding whether a class
waiver is enforceable.
Of course, if an arbitral class waiver is not enforced the question arises
whether the dispute will go to class arbitration or class litigation. Class
arbitration might be bad for the reasons stated in Stolt and Concepcion,197
such as concern about entrusting an arbitrator “with ensuring that third
parties’ due process rights are satisfied.”198 For these reasons, courts
might readily enforce arbitration agreements saying that if the class
waiver is unenforceable then the arbitration clause is cancelled, so the
parties will litigate rather than arbitrate.199 In fact, after striking down
class waivers, courts might even send parties to class litigation rather than
class arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement specifically says that if
the court invalidates the class waiver, the rest of the arbitration agreement
survives. In sum, striking down arbitral class waivers does not have to
yield much, if any, class arbitration. Arbitration law can retreat to the
sidelines of the class action wars, by adopting a neutral position on class
waivers, without producing whatever practical problems class arbitration
creates.
195. See infra Part II.
196. See infra Appendix.
197. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–49 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–87 (2010).
198. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
199. See, e.g., Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting the
arbitration agreement between Verizon and Verizon customers as follows: “IF FOR SOME
REASON THE PROHIBITION ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS . . . IS DEEMED
UNENFORCEABLE, THEN THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WILL NOT APPLY”) This
would avoid the fear that “when courts hold class-arbitration waivers unconscionable, they are
essentially turning individual arbitration clauses into class arbitration clauses, changing the
fundamental nature of what the parties agreed to.” Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57, at 1168.
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II. CONGRUITY AND GOOD POLICY: A THEORY OF “ARBITRATION” AS
USED IN THE FAA
Section I of this Article advanced the principle of congruity.
Arbitration law should be congruous with non-arbitration law. Adhesive
arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other adhesion
contracts. However, this principle of congruity should not be taken to the
extreme. In a few relatively uncontroversial ways, adhesive arbitration
agreements should remain more enforceable than other adhesion
contracts. These exceptions to the congruity principle are good policy and
necessary to preserve “arbitration” as that term is used in governing law,
including the FAA, and ordinary speech.
A. Relatively Uncontroversial Topics on Which Courts Enforce
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements More Broadly than Other
Adhesion Contracts
While the three topics Section I discusses—contract defenses (the
separability doctrine), correcting legally erroneous arbitration awards,
and class waivers—are examples of law enforcing adhesive arbitration
agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts, they are not the
only such examples. They are the controversial examples. They are
controversial because, on these topics, good policy counsels for treating
adhesive arbitration agreements like other adhesion contracts—for
conforming arbitration law to non-arbitration law. To put it another way,
contract defenses (the separability doctrine), correcting legally erroneous
decisions of mandatory law, and class waivers are topics on which
arbitration should not be permitted to compete with litigation. As
Professor Chris Drahozal and I wrote:
[A]rbitration and litigation are substitutes for each other.
Providers of arbitration services—individual arbitrators and
administering institutions like the American Arbitration
Association—compete with providers of litigation
services—courts established by state governments and the
federal government—as if they are selling competing
products on a store shelf.200
This competition between arbitration and litigation should not extend
to contract defenses, correcting legally erroneous decisions of mandatory
law, or class waivers. The law should not permit arbitration to attract
customers with the sales pitch, “Buy our product to avoid contract
defenses and costly class actions, while negating consumers’ and
employees’ statutory rights!”
200. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433 (2010).
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In contrast, the law should permit arbitration to attract customers with
the sales pitch, “Buy our product so you can, within wide limits, select
your adjudicator and procedural rules.” Arbitration allows parties more
freedom to select their adjudicators—the arbitrator(s)—than litigation,
where the law largely confines parties to the adjudicators—the judge or
jury—the court system selects.201 Also, arbitration allows parties to
depart from the rules of civil procedure and evidence that would be
imposed on them in litigation.202 Parties often choose arbitral rules that
tend to have less elaborate discovery than in litigation203 and less
elaborate rules of evidence than in litigation.204 So by forming an
201. Of course, parties in litigation have some role in selecting their adjudicators, for
example, forum shopping of various sorts and peremptory challenges of jurors.
202. WARE, supra note 6, § 2.35.
203. Id. § 2.36(d); John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract Clauses: A Potential Key to a CostEffective Process, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 9, 9 (many parties are expanding their
arbitration clauses to “place meaningful limits on discovery”). Many arbitration agreements
incorporate the rules of an arbitration organization, such as the American Arbitration Association.
These rules typically do not grant the parties rights to broad discovery but rather grant the
arbitrator wide discretion in authorizing discovery. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 19–20 (2013). Professor Hensler
and Professor Linda Demaine conducted a study of consumer arbitration clauses and found:
Seventeen of the clauses (32.7%) discuss discovery, and eleven (21.2%) discuss
evidentiary standards. In most instances, these clauses alert consumers that
discovery may be limited and evidentiary standards may be relaxed by
comparison to litigation. Twelve of the clauses that address discovery convey
that discovery may or will be limited. Three state that no discovery will be
allowed. The remaining two specify that local discovery rules will apply.
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 68
(2004).
204. WARE, supra note 6, § 2.37(c). Rules of evidence are historically intertwined with the
jury. ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 82–84, 243–60 (2001). Thus, it is no
surprise that arbitration (without a jury) tends to have less elaborate rules of evidence than those
used in jury trials. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 203, at 23 (“The arbitrator shall
determine the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and may exclude
evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant.”); Stanley Weinstein, An
Arbitrator’s Wish List, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 54, 57 (2003) (“[I]n most arbitration proceedings
witnesses can be asked leading questions and testify as to hearsay evidence.”); Sanford F. Young,
Conventional Wisdoms or Mistakes: The Complaint and the Response, 76 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J.,
28, 29 (2004) (“[R]ules of evidence are generally only loosely applied, with hearsay statements
(including affidavits) and documents usually freely admitted.”). Arbitrators’ general liberality in
accepting evidence is due in part to the fact that “refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy” is one of the few grounds for vacating the arbitration award, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(3) (2012), while hearing evidence that would not be admissible in court is not a ground
for vacatur. Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013–14 (10th Cir.
1994) (refusing to vacate the award won by a lawyer who introduced evidence that would not
have been admissible in litigation); WHD, L.P. v. Mayflower Capital, LLC, 673 S.E.2d 168, 2009
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arbitration agreement, parties trade away their rights to a jury and, in
many arbitration agreements, also trade away some rights to discovery
and to particular rules of evidence.205
In all these respects, courts generally seem to enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements more broadly than they enforce other adhesion
contracts. For example, the FAA requires enforcement of adhesive
agreements providing for an arbitrator, rather than a jury, in
circumstances under which at least some courts would not enforce an
adhesive non-arbitration agreement’s clause requiring a bench trial
(before a judge) rather than a jury trial.206 And arbitration law generally
WL 368335, at *5 (N.C. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision) (refusing to vacate an arbitration
award where the arbitrator may have relied on evidence that would not have been admissible in
litigation). The study conducted by Professors Hensler and Professor Demaine found 21.2% of
studied consumer arbitration clauses
discuss evidentiary standards. In most instances, these clauses alert consumers
that . . . evidentiary standards may be relaxed by comparison to litigation. . . .
Three of the clauses that address evidentiary issues state explicitly that neither
federal nor state procedural or evidentiary rules will apply, and another two state
that evidentiary standards in arbitration may be less rigorous than in court. Three
provide that either the Federal Rules of Evidence or state and local rules of
evidence will apply. The remaining three convey partial evidentiary guidelines
for the arbitration—for example, by stating that the arbitrator may compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at the hearing.
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 203, at 68.
205. See supra notes 165–67, 202–04 and accompanying text.
206. Ware, supra note 117, at 81. A few states do not enforce adhesive or other pre-dispute
contracts requiring a bench trial rather than jury trial, but most do. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 22B-10 (2015) (“Any provision in a contract requiring a party to the contract to waive his right
to a jury trial is unconscionable as a matter of law and the provision shall be unenforceable. This
section does not prohibit parties from entering into agreements to arbitrate . . . .”), Grafton
Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 492 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a pre-dispute
agreement that any lawsuit between parties would be adjudicated in a court trial, and not by jury
trial, was unenforceable), and Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994) (holding
that “pre-litigation contractual waivers of the right to trial by jury are not enforceable”), with In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132–33 (Tex. 2004) (“[N]early every state court
that has considered the issue has held that parties may agree to waive their right to trial by jury in
certain future disputes, including the supreme courts in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Nevada,
and Rhode Island. The same is true of federal courts. . . . We believe this overwhelming weight
of authority is correct.” (footnotes omitted)). However, some of the courts that do enforce jurywaiver clauses require them to satisfy a higher standard of consent than the contract-law standards
of consent in arbitration law. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 673–
74; Ware, supra note 153, at 197–205 (“In sum, contract-law standards are generally used for the
waiver of constitutional rights in property-deprivation cases, forum-selection cases, and consentto jurisdiction cases, as well as in arbitration cases. Case law governing jury-waiver clauses stands
out because of its failure to apply contract-law standards of consent and its requirement that
consent be ‘knowing.’”).
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enforces adhesive arbitration agreements effectively reducing
discovery207 and evidentiary rules,208 whereas research revealed no case
enforcing an adhesive non-arbitration agreement reducing discovery209 or
evidentiary rules.210
This disparity between arbitration and litigation should not be
troubling if, as under the Centrist Position, courts can police arbitration
agreements for unconscionability. If an adhesive arbitration agreement’s
choice of arbitrator, discovery limitations, or evidence rules is
207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (finding lesser discovery in arbitration an insufficient reason to
deny enforcement of an adhesive employment arbitration agreement).
208. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
209. During litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 29 allows the parties to
“stipulate that . . . other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified.” FED. R. CIV. P.
29. But research revealed no authority for enforcing pre-dispute, let alone adhesive, nonarbitration agreements purportedly reducing discovery. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 124, at
202–03 (discussing post-dispute, but not pre-dispute, agreements to limit discovery); Charles W.
Tyler, Lawmaking in the Shadow of the Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best
Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 122 YALE L.J. 1560, 1573 (2013) (“No cases have
authoritatively addressed whether ex ante contractual provisions limiting the scope of discovery
or the presentation of evidence in the event of a dispute are enforceable.”). Some commentators
refer to the possibility “the parties agree ahead of the dispute to . . . limit discovery” without
discussing whether such an agreement would be enforced. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement,
Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1475, 1482 (2013); see also Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97
VA. L. REV. 723, 746–47 (2011) (citing only an unpublished draft by Kapeliuk & Klement for the
proposition that “[a]t the discovery phase, contracts typically limit rather than expand discovery”).
210. Courts enforce some post-dispute agreements (often called stipulations) on evidentiary
matters. See, e.g., Tupman Thurlow Co. v. S.S. Cap Castillo, 490 F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1974)
(“[T]he parties stipulated that the contents of the USDA file would be admissible, and these
documents were contained in that file. Therefore, the documents are admissible.”). However,
research revealed no examples of courts enforcing pre-dispute agreements, let alone as part of an
adhesion contract, to alter the rules of evidence. See Henry S. Noyes, supra note 87, at 607–08.
Although Professor Noyes writes that “ex ante contracts to alter the rules of evidence are
enforceable,” he cites a criminal case in which the agreement to alter the rules of evidence was
post-dispute in the sense that the criminal defendant had already been arrested and charged.
Noyes, supra note 87, at 607 (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 198, 208 n.5
(1995)). For older cases that support waiver of evidentiary rules through contract, see Note,
Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138, 139 (1932). Professor David H.
Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe wrote that “a contract may specify that evidence in the form of hearsay
that would otherwise be admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception would be inadmissible unless
the declarant were unavailable to testify.” David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by
Contract: A Convoluted Influence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 n.5 (2002) (citing John Kobayashi, Too
Little, Too Late: Use and Abuse of Innocuous Yet Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, in 2 ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY: TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1127, 1141–45 (1991)). I have not located the
Kobayashi source, and note that Ms. Cliffe and Professor Taylor do not assert that the “contract”
avoiding a hearsay exception was or can be a pre-dispute, let alone adhesive, contract.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss5/1

48

Ware: The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law

2016]

CURRENT (CONSERVATIVE) ARBITRATION LAW

1275

unconscionable then it will not be enforced.211 With that safeguard,
arbitration should be allowed to compete against litigation by offering
different adjudicators and different procedural rules on discovery and
evidence.
B. A Theory of “Arbitration” as Used in the FAA: Almost Concepcion
This view of good arbitration policy is similar to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the FAA in Concepcion, except perhaps on the issue
central to Concepcion: class waivers. Concepcion interprets FAA § 2
which says:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.212
Concepcion said:
Although [FAA] § 2’s saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent
to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. . . .
211. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding that limited discovery “could significantly prejudice employees or applicants”);
Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 F. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
unconscionability based in part on discovery limitations); Murray v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce, and finding
unconscionable, an employment arbitration agreement where, though the parties ostensibly
engaged in an alternate strike method to select the single arbitrator from a list of prospective
arbitrators, they were to exercise these alternate strikes from a list of arbitrators provided by the
employer); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938–41 (4th Cir. 1999) (deciding under
duty of good faith and fair dealing, rather than unconscionability); Lucey v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *35–36 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2007) (finding the
arbitration provision unconscionable in part because of a provision “virtually eliminating
discovery”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 305 F. App’x 875 (3d Cir. 2009); State ex rel. Vincent
v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 859, 861 (Mo. 2006) (holding unconscionable a provision stating
that “[t]he arbitrator shall be selected by the President of the Homebuilders Association of Greater
St. Louis” (emphasis omitted)); see also Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538,
545–47 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (refusing to enforce a nursing home arbitration contract limiting
depositions to defendant’s expert witnesses); Geiger v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F.
Supp. 2d 985, 996, 999 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding an arbitration provision as void where it only
allowed one deposition as of right); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601, 614
(D.S.C. 1998) (holding just one deposition was a “severe discovery limitation[]”); Jara v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 5569, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012)
(“The limitation of discovery [to two depositions] also renders the agreement substantively
unconscionable.”).
212. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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. . . The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the
text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability
of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA.
....
The point of affording parties discretion in designing
arbitration processes is to allow efficient, streamlined
procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be specified,
for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the
relevant field . . . .
. . . Parties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process
rivaling that in litigation. Arbitration is a matter of contract,
and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations.
But what the parties in the aforementioned examples would
have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA,
lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state
law.213
In these passages, Concepcion interprets the FAA’s use of the word
“arbitration” to refer to a streamlined form of binding adjudication.214 So
interpreted, the FAA prohibits states from holding unconscionable the
very procedures that do the streamlining—(1) less discovery, (2) fewer
evidentiary rules, (3) no jury, and (4) no class actions—because that
would hold unconscionable the very process the FAA commands courts
to enforce.
Contrary to Concepcion, some argue that FAA § 2’s savings clause—
enforcing arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract”—merely prohibits states
from discriminating against arbitration agreements215 and thus allows
states to hold unenforceable whatever arbitration agreement provisions
the state wants, if the state also holds the same provisions unenforceable
213. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–45, 351 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 344–46.
215. E.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner,
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, (No. 09-893), at 7–8 (“Section 2 thus created what is essentially an
‘equal protection clause’ for contract provisions, such that arbitration agreements would be treated
at least as well as all other contracts.” (quoting Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable
Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing
the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 43 (2006))); Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s
Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1265–66 (2011).
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when they appear in non-arbitration agreements.216 However,
Concepcion correctly interprets FAA § 2’s use of the word “arbitration”
to make § 2 more than just a prohibition against discriminating against
arbitration agreements. “Arbitration” is widely understood to mean a
form of binding adjudication217 that is not litigation. However, if a state
could hold unconscionable any agreement for binding adjudication that
does not use the same procedural and evidentiary rules as litigation and
the same trier of fact (jury) as litigation, then the so-called “arbitration”
left enforceable in that state would be too close to litigation to qualify as
“arbitration” as that term is used in FAA § 2. The only significant
difference between this so-called “arbitration” and litigation would be
that the parties would select and pay for the “judge” conducting the jury
trial under the same rules of procedure and evidence that a
governmentally selected and paid judge in litigation would use. So § 2
must be interpreted to prevent states from holding unconscionable
agreements to use a form of binding adjudication that differs from
litigation more profoundly than merely selecting and paying for the
judge.
How much more profoundly? A form of binding adjudication that
significantly differs from litigation by having (1) less discovery, (2) fewer
evidentiary rules, and (3) no jury should be different enough to qualify as

216. The California Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in its holding overturned by
Concepcion. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112–13 (Cal. 2005); see also
Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 215, at 8 n.2 (“For example, a
state-law rule requiring particularized notice (e.g., minimum font size, boldface type) for jurytrial waivers in any contract would fall within Section 2’s savings clause because it would be
‘grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
217. “‘Adjudication’ refers to the process by which final, authoritative decisions are rendered
by a neutral third party who enters the controversy without previous knowledge of the dispute.”
ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006). “The traditional model of arbitration is precisely that
of the ‘private tribunal’—private individuals, chosen voluntarily by the parties to a dispute in
preference to the ‘official’ courts, and given power to hear and ‘judge’ their ‘case.’” Id. at 599;
see also 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1743 (2009) (describing
“the adjudicative character of international arbitration, in which the arbitrators are obligated to
decide the parties’ dispute impartially and objectively, based upon the law and the evidence the
parties present”); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.1, at 2:37 n.1 (1994) (“Arbitration is a form of adjudication because the
parties participate in the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to an
arbitrator whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute as presented.”); Lon Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (“[T]he distinguishing
characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected [disputing] party a
peculiar form of participation in decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a
decision in his favor.”).
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“arbitration,”218 and thus immune from characterization as per se
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Concepcion’s interpretation
of FAA § 2 adds a fourth difference required to be different enough to
qualify as “arbitration”: (4) no class actions. As stated above, this
conclusion of Concepcion is plausible as an interpretation of the FAA,
but, as a matter of policy, I think the enforceability of arbitral class
waivers ought to conform to non-arbitration law on class waivers. In
contrast, arbitration law ought to continue departing from non-arbitration
law by enforcing agreements to use (compared to litigation) less
discovery, fewer evidentiary rules, and no jury.
CONCLUSION
Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly
than other adhesion contracts in three important and controversial
respects: contract defenses (the separability doctrine), correction of
legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers. In contrast, this Article’s
Centrist Position proposes changes that will on these three topics make
adhesive arbitration agreements only as enforceable as other adhesion
contracts. The Centrist Position, however, allows arbitration to maintain
its relatively uncontroversial distinctions from litigation by enforcing
arbitration agreements more broadly than non-arbitration agreements
with respect to jury waivers and rules of discovery and evidence.
Adoption of the Centrist Position will thus make arbitration law more
congruous with non-arbitration law while still maintaining arbitration’s
essential distinctions from litigation.

218. The combined (federal and state) U. S. court system’s distinctive adjudicator—the civil
jury—is connected to its distinctive procedures. The United States is the only major nation to
make extensive use of jury trials in civil cases. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193–94 n.1 (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil jury
as “a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ,
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 267 (Tony Weir, trans. 1977); Christopher R. Drahozal
& Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357, 389 (2002); Ware, Consumer, supra note 72, at 868 (“The civil jury
impacts nearly every aspect of civil litigation in the United States. To give just three examples,
the civil jury bears a large share of responsibility for: (1) the cost and intrusiveness of U.S.
discovery; (2) the theatrics of U.S. trials; and (3) the complexity of U.S. evidence law.”).
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APPENDIX
A. Proposed CFPB Rule
1. Notwithstanding any law or agreement to the contrary:
a. An agreement between a covered person and a consumer
for a consumer financial product or service providing for
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties is
enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
b. Whether such agreement or ground exists shall, on
request of a party to such alleged agreement, be
determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration
challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in
conjunction with other terms of the contract containing
such agreement.
c. If such agreement requires claims to be brought on an
individual, rather than class, basis then such requirement
shall be as enforceable as such a requirement in a nonarbitration agreement would be under similar
circumstances.
2. In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration awards, a state
or federal court shall vacate an award arising out of an agreement between
a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or
service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties
where the award was based on the arbitrators’ error of law and, at the time
of their most recent agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration,
the parties could not have formed an enforceable contract to avoid such
law.
Comment: This proposal is intended to overrule (with respect to
agreements within the Bureau’s jurisdiction) the holding or possible
implications of the following cases:
1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
2. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006).
3. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63
(2010).
4. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576 (2008).
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5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333
(2011).
6. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,
559 U.S. 662 (2010).
7. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133
S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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